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ABSTRACT 
The remarkable progress of transplant medicine in the latter half of the twentieth century has led to 
an unprecedented demand for donated organs that have historically remained in short supply. Although a 
clinically effective procedure, organ transplant’s health benefit to the society is seriously limited by the 
shortage of organs. The resulting tragic and preventable loss of life is therefore a public health concern. 
This dissertation examines the efficiency and the effectiveness of the organ procurement process and its 
impact on the cost and availability of transplantable organs. Specifically, three issues are examined using 
data from western Pennsylvania and West Virginia, a region served by the Center for Organ Recovery and 
Education (CORE).  
First, the effect of process breakdown on the availability of transplantable organs is examined using 
generalized linear model. The principal finding is that for every process breakdown in the care of a potential 
donor, one less organ is available for transplant. Consequently, 25 organs were lost to process breakdowns 
over the three-year study period. 
Second, the cost of promoting the donor registry and its effect on the supply of organ donors is 
examined using decision analysis model. The principal finding is that CORE’s promotion efforts would 
generate 4.2 present-day donors at a cost of $726,000 per donor. When compared with previously published 
estimates of a donor’s monetary value to the society, CORE’s promotion efforts offer good return on 
investment. 
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Third, the impact of donor registry promotion on organ shortage is examined. Our analysis indicates 
that the impact threshold of registry promotion is reached at 64 donors that yield 73 kidneys, 45 livers, 18 
lungs and 15 hearts. The principal finding is that registry promotion alone cannot arrest the growth in 
transplant waiting list. Although a cost-effective strategy, registry promotion has a significant budget 
impact. 
Living donation and innovations that expand the donor pool or improve the organ acceptance rate 
may be able to arrest the growth in the waiting list. However, burden of waiting list deaths rests primarily 
on the causes of end-stage organ failure rather than organ shortage. Prevention and early intervention 
remain the first line of defense. 
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CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ORGAN DONATION AND 
TRANSPLANTATION- LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROPOSED RESEARCH 
1.1.  INTRODUCTION 
The American story of organ donation and transplantation is both remarkable and disappointing. 
From being an experimental medical procedure only a few decades ago, organ transplantation has evolved 
as the treatment of choice for end-stage organ disease. Yet thousands of lives are tragically lost to organ 
failure every year. In 2012 alone, 6,473 people died from end-stage organ disease in spite of abundant 
financial and technological resources available for organ transplantation  [1]. The remarkable progress of 
transplant medicine in the latter half of the twentieth century has led to an unprecedented demand for 
donated organs that have historically remained in short supply. As a result, relatively few organs are 
transplanted, compared to the number of people with end-stage disease. In 2012, more than 116,000 patients 
were on the waiting list for an organ transplant but only about 28,000 transplants were performed from 
14,000 donors [1]. Although a clinically effective procedure, its health benefit to the society is seriously 
limited by the shortage of organs. The resulting tragic and preventable loss of life is therefore a public 
health concern.  
The shortage of transplantable organs in the United States was apparent as early as 1988 when 
collection of organ transplant data had just begun. Figure 1 presents the widening gap between demand and 
supply of organs for transplant.  In 1988, there were 16,026 people waiting for an organ transplant but only 
1 
 
12,623 organs from 5,909 donors were transplanted with net shortage of at least1 3,403 organs [1, 2]. By 
2012, the number of organs falling short has increased to over 98,992 [1, 2]. While the number of donors 
has been increasing at a steady rate, the number of people who are eligible for a transplant has, far out-
paced the supply of organs. It is therefore ironical that the benefits of transplant medicine are limited by the 
consequence of its own success. And it is this great paradox that makes this issue interesting and 
challenging.  
 
 
Figure 1: Demand and supply of transplantable organs in the U.S. (1988 thru 2012) 
 
There are three main sections in this chapter. Section 1.2 visits the historical developments that 
resulted in favorable conditions for the evolution of transplant medicine. Why transplant medicine owes its 
remarkable progress in the past fifty years to a confluence of technological innovations in varied disciplines 
1 The historical data on transplant waiting list obtained through request to OPTN show the number of candidates and 
not registrations waiting for a transplant. While each candidate needs at least one organ for transplant, some of these 
candidates may require multiple organ transplants. Thus in 1988, the 16,026 candidates on the waiting needed at least 
as many number of organs. Therefore after transplanting 12,623 organs, the organ deficit was at least 3,403. Organ 
deficit might be greater if there were some multi-organ transplant candidates on the waiting list. 
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is discussed. The brief history of organ transplantation presented here draws attention to the rapid evolution 
of transplant medicine and the consequent rapid rise in demand for organs.  
Section 1.3 recounts how society has responded to the increasingly evident need for transplantable 
organs and the ethical issues concerning removal of organs from the human body. Regulatory and 
legislative breakthroughs since the 1960s and episodic but radical changes to the practice of organ 
procurement are discussed. Central to this discussion are the laws governing determination of death, 
creation of a national system for procuring organs, and the role of these developments in structuring the 
organ donation and transplantation system into its current form.  
Section 1.4 details the structure of the organ procurement network with particular emphasis on the 
activities of organ procurement organizations. Finally, in sections 1.5 through 1.7 the context of the 
proposed research questions is examined. Motivation for the research questions is discussed under the 
individual research papers.   
1.2. HISTORY OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION- FROM EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE TO 
CLINICAL MEDICINE 
The idea of transplanting body parts to restore bodily function and esthetics is not new. Examples 
of creatures with body parts from different species- referred to as chimeric beasts- are abundant in Greek 
mythology. The New Testament also contains several occurrences of auto-transplantation [3]. These 
occurrences include the story of the Jesus of Nazareth restoring a servant’s ear that was sliced off by Simon 
Peter’s sword during a battle. Other recorded accounts detail the stories of St. Peter replanting St. Agatha’s 
breasts and St. Mark restoring a soldier’s right hand that was severed in battle. An extraordinary description 
of a cadaveric allograft can be found in Legenda Aura. In the “miracle of the black leg”, two saints replace 
3 
Justinian’s gangrenous leg with the leg of a recently buried Ethiopian man [4]. The oldest evidence of 
transplanting body parts dates back to the Bronze Age. Evidence of bone grafts being used to close the 
cranium post-trephination can be found in the archeological records from this age [5]. Detailed descriptions 
of using skin grafts to reconstruct amputated nose and damaged ears are found in the ancient Hindu texts 
dating as far back as 2500-3000 BCE [6, 7].  
Between 16th and 20th century, this ancient idea began to evolve into modern day transplant 
medicine. The few developments that occurred in this era are noted by Hossein Shayan [8]. An upper arm 
skin graft was used by an Italian surgeon for nose reconstruction in 1590s [8]. In the 17th century, teeth 
were successfully grafted in humans. A Scottish surgeon, John Hunter, had some success with Achilles 
tendon allografts [8]. By the beginning of the 18th century, experiments with skin and corneal grafts; 
thyroid, adrenal and ovarian grafts and other connective tissue grafts were reported [9]. In the 19th century, 
corneal and skin graft procedures made significant progress. In 1837, Samuel Bigger transplanted a full-
thickness corneal graft into the blind eye of a gazelle [7]. In 1898, Winston Churchill was asked to donate 
some skin from his arm to an injured officer in a famous case of allogenic skin graft. Churchill’s description 
of the incident in his own words alludes to the long-term success of the skin graft [7]:  
“A piece of skin and some flesh about the size of a shilling from the inside of my arm. This precious fragment 
was grafted to my friend's wound. It remains there to this day and did him lasting good in many ways. I for my part 
keep the scar as a souvenir.”  
With the arrival of the 20th century, a confluence of progressive and parallel developments in the 
fields of vascular surgery, physiology, immunology and pharmacology revolutionized organ transplantation 
from a mere subject of Greek legends into clinically effective medicine. Experimental models on animals, 
influential case studies and clinical trials with organ transplantation are reviewed in detail by Peter K. 
Linden and Thomas E. Starzl in their respective seminal articles [3, 10]. Following a 1999 conference at 
the University of California, Los Angeles, a consensus paper identifying important historical milestones in 
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the evolution of transplant medicine was published in the World Journal of Surgery [11]. The findings of 
the consensus conference were also summarized by Starzl a year later [12]. We briefly review those 
developments in science, technology and our understanding of the human body that brought a paradigm 
shift in transplantation science.  
By the twentieth century, what Peter K. Linden refers to as the beginning of the “pre-modern era” 
(1900-1959), successful skin grafts and corneal transplants were being frequently reported [13, 14]. The 
logical progression from this point was in the direction of organ transplantation. Animal studies on organ 
transplantation, failed renal transplantation in humans, innovations in vascular surgery and seminal 
observations in immunology characterize this era. The main challenge with organ transplantation at the 
time was that organs are sensitive to ischemia and need major vessel anastomosis for vascular supply as 
opposed to skin grafts where capillary anastomoses are sufficient. Between 1902 and 1905, French surgeon 
Alexis Carrel refined the vascular anastomotic suturing methods, vessel reconstruction procedures, and cold 
preservation techniques [15, 16]. With these innovations, it was now possible to surgically plant organs 
from one animal into another of the same species. However in ensuing animal transplant models, Carrel 
discovered that an adverse host response to the foreign graft was a hurdle in realizing clinical 
transplantation. As he famously observed [9]: 
“Should an organ, extirpated from an animal and replanted into its owner by a certain technique, 
continue to functionate normally, and should it cease to functionate normally when transplanted into 
another animal by the same technique, the physiological disturbance could not be considered as brought 
about by the organ but would be due to the influence of the host, that is, the biological factors.” 
Nevertheless renal transplantation in humans with allografts and xenografts was attempted in 
Russia and France- albeit with disastrous results [3, 17]. The first breakthrough in the understanding of the 
host response to allografts came during World War I when the increased need for skin grafts for battle 
injuries steered Peter Medawar, a British surgeon, into investigating the causes of skin allograft rejection. 
5 
He observed that skin grafts between monozygotic twins (identical twins- those who essentially share the 
same genetic code) were well tolerated [18]. Later in 1954, Joseph Murray and John Merrill reported a 
successful renal transplant between male monozygotic twins [19]. These findings suggested two things: 1) 
the host immune system had an important role in graft rejection; and 2) “Iatrogenic suppression of the 
recipient’s immune system was the keystone to breaking the genetic compatibility barrier” [3].  
Initial attempts at iatrogenic immune suppression employed cytoablative radiation. However it soon 
became apparent that this method was too crude to achieve meaningful health benefits as vast majority of 
patients died from the complications of total body irradiation such as infections and malignancy [20]. 
Development of antileukemic drugs promised a more refined method of suppressing the immune system. 
Pharmacologic immune suppression with prednisone was first tested on a female kidney recipient in 1960. 
The patient died after 5 months [21]. Immunosuppression with either azathioprine or 6-mercaptopurine also 
yielded poor survival rate with only one of the ten transplant recipients surviving to six months post-transplant 
[22, 23]. The transplant revolution was halted until the early 1960s when Thomas Starzl at the University of 
Colorado demonstrated that high doses of prednisone with azathioprine could reverse graft rejection and even 
induce tolerance in the host [24]. Soon after Starzl overcame the genetic compatibility barrier, experimental 
renal transplants became clinical medicine although complications of lymphocyte depletion remained a 
problem [25]. A decade later, Borel & Stähelin discovered cyclosporine which was effective in 
immunosuppression but exhibited little cytotoxicity [26] and till date, combined with Starzl’s “cocktail”, this 
drug offers least harmful immune suppression [8].  
Parallel to the development of pharmacological immunosuppression, advances in immunology led 
to the development of immunologic screening. In 1964, guidelines for ABO matching were developed to 
prevent transplanted organs from infracting due to ABO mismatch and resulting agglutination-related 
obstruction of microvasculature [27]. A year later, Terasaki et al. introduced the lymphocytotoxic 
crossmatch test to determine if the recipient’s serum was presensitized to donor’s lymphocytes [28]. Around 
the same time, Terasaki et al. also developed the Human Leukocyte Antigen crossmatch (HLA corssmatch) 
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serum assay to detect preformed anti-graft HLA antibodies [29]. Advances in organ procurement and 
preservation also contributed to the rapid rise of transplantation as a clinically effective procedure. In the 
1980s, “flexible” surgical techniques for rapid removal of multiple organs were developed by Starzl et al. 
[30, 31]. By 1905, Alexis Carrel had already pioneered the hypothermic preservation technique [16]. 
Further practicable advancements in organ preservation technology were made several decades later when 
the innovative yet logistically challenging machine perfusion technique [32] was replaced by the simple 
flush technique [33]. 
The remarkable evolution of organ transplantation is not unique. In fact rapid advancements in 
basic biomedical sciences and engineering and technology that were fundamental to the rise of organ 
transplantation also revolutionized medicine in general. However dependence on donated organs for 
transplants poses a challenge that is unique to this field of medicine. Indeed shortage of donated organs is 
proving to be an insurmountable barrier for the transplantation community. Consequently, the organ 
donation community continues to evolve as the demand for organs ever increases. 
1.3. HISTORY OF ORGAN DONATION- MAKING OF A NEW HEALTHCARE SUB-
SECTOR 
In the early sixties when critical care medicine and organ preservation were a fledgling science, 
organ transplants were limited to kidneys donated by living relatives and friends. Laws premised on the 
ethical principle of non-maleficence barred donation of other vital organs by living donors. The colloquial 
“dead-donor rule” was based on the ethical expectation that organs that were necessary to sustain life could 
be removed only after a donor is declared dead [34-36]. The problem was that without modern intensive 
care, organ health in critically ill individuals was already compromised. Furthermore, ischemic insult from 
circulatory failure at death meant that cadaveric organs readily became unfit for transplantation. Without 
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modern critical care and effective organ preservation, the dead-donor rule seriously limited the scope of 
transplant medicine.  
Advancements in critical care created what Linden describes as the “patient-donor substrate” of 
viable cadaveric organs [3]. Contemporaneous innovations in organ preservation allowed removal and 
transportation of cadaveric organs with minimal ischemic insult making cadaveric organ transplants a real 
possibility. Ironically, advancements in intensive care also made it difficult to determine when a critically 
ill individual had passed away. Prior to the development of modern critical care, an individual was deemed 
to have died after cessation of heartbeat and breathing [37]. Loss of neurologic function inevitably led to 
the same result and therefore death, regardless of the cause, could be certainly determined. With 
advancements in perfusion and oxygenation technology in the 1960s, circulation and respiration could be 
maintained even when there was no neurologic function. Consequently, cessation of heartbeat and breathing 
was of no value in determining death in patients who had suffered serious, irreversible brain injury but who 
were on mechanical ventilation.  
In 1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School proposed irreversible coma as a 
criterion for determining death2 [38]. According to the committee’s report, individuals in irreversible coma 
are unreceptive and unresponsive to even the most noxious stimuli; they lack spontaneous breathing and 
other movements; no reflexes including pupillary, corneal, pharyngeal and stretch tendon reflexes or ocular 
movements can be detected; and the electroencephalogram shows no brain activity [38]. The concept of 
brain death thence introduced offered an alternative definition of death that was independent of circulation 
and respiration. This new development was of great import. First, it expedited substitution of mechanical 
ventilation with care that more befitted the dead. Second, it freed the scarce intensive care resource for 
those who might benefit from its use. Last, precious time saved in identifying brain-dead donors greatly 
improved prospects of a successful cadaveric organ transplant. 
2 Also referred to as the “Harvard Criteria” 
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The year of 1968 saw other important developments. The New England Organ Bank, the first ever 
organ procurement organization that was independent of a transplant center was established in Boston, 
Massachusetts [39]. In the same year, the Uniform Law Commission3 formally recognized the power of 
individuals to donate organs and tissues for transplantation through the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(UAGA) [39]. To address the significant variation in organ procurement policies across the country the 
UAGA, in 1972, mandated that donor card be recognized as a legally binding document in all 50 states 
[40]. The irreversible coma criteria and the UAGA provided the initial framework within which organ 
donation was handled in the 70s. Nevertheless there was wide variation in the adoption of the neurologic 
criteria across the country since many states, through statutory law, continued to recognize the cessation of 
circulation and respiration as the sole criterion for determining death.  
The Uniform Law Commission attempted to address this variation by drafting the Uniform Brain Death 
Act in 1978. Based on the rationale that, “brain, as the center of the human body, is its most important organ. 
Its irreversible functioning should be accepted as death”, the legislation deemed an individual to have died when 
there was "irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, including the brain stem" [41]. The actual 
determination of death was based on "reasonable medical standards." Cessation of circulation and respiration 
was assumed to automatically conform to the neurologic criteria and was omitted from the act itself, which 
proved confusing for the states that were trying to adopt the legislation.  
To address this legal ambiguity, the President’s Commission4 in 1981 published a report5 making 
several influential observations [42]. 
“That recent developments in medical treatment necessitate a restatement of the standards 
traditionally recognized for determining that death has occurred.” 
“That such a restatement ought preferably to be a matter of statutory law.” 
3 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  http://www.uniformlaws.org  
4 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
5 Defining Death: A Report on the Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in Determination of Death 
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“That the statutory law ought to be uniform among the several states.” 
“That the definition contained in the statute ought to address general physiological standards 
rather than medical criteria and tests, which will change with advances in biomedical knowledge and 
refinements in technique.” 
Working closely with the Uniform Law Commission and with input from the American Medical 
Association6 and the American Bar Association7, the President’s Commission proposed a revised draft of 
the Uniform Brain Death Act. This act known as Uniform Determination of Death Act was set forth as 
follows [42]: 
 § 1. [Determination of Death.] An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation 
of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted 
medical standards. 
§ 2. [Uniformity of Construction and Application.] This act shall be applied and construed to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this Act among states 
enacting it. 
The Uniform Determination of Death Act served several purposes. First, the legislation established 
the legality of brain death as an alternative criterion for determining death where mechanical ventilation 
precluded the use of traditional criterion. Second, it provided a uniform basis for determining death across 
the country. Third, by using physiological standards instead of diagnostic tests as the basis for 
determination, the proposed legislation was immune to becoming obsolete when medical science advanced. 
6 http://www.ama-assn.org/ama 
7 http://www.americanbar.org/aba.html  
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The draft legislation was adopted by the 50 states and having settled this issue, the focus shifted towards 
increasing the availability of cadaveric organs.  
In 1983, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop convened the first workshop on solid organ procurement 
for transplant [43]. The workshop culminated with the formation of the American Council on 
Transplantation. With the goal to “increase availability of organs and tissues for transplantation through 
post mortem donation and surgical procurement”, the newly formed council identified “promoting effective 
use of multiple organs” as an important objective [43]. At that time transplant centers typically relied on 
the local network of donor hospitals for cadaveric organs. Specificity of the donor-recipient match meant 
that wastage of organs was rampant. It was increasingly evident that only a national network that offered a 
large donor-recipient pool would ensure that all viable cadaveric organs are matched to recipients and 
transplanted. 
In 1984, the National Organ Transplant Act (Public Law 98-507, 98th Congress) came into effect 
with four important provisions. Title I created a Task Force on Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
comprising of physicians, lawyers, representatives from healthcare organizations and lay people to study 
and recommend improvements in the structure and practice of organ procurement and transplantation. Title 
II established the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) as a national, integrated 
network of donor hospitals, transplant centers and bridging organizations. In addition, title II outlined the 
creation of the organ procurement organizations (OPO) that would act as the bridge between procurement 
and transplantation. This title also provided for the creation of a scientific registry8. Title III prohibited sale 
and purchase of human organs. Title IV provided for a demonstration project on a national bone marrow 
registry. The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) would be amended in 1990 to permanently establish 
and maintain the National Bone Marrow Donor Registry [41].  
8 It is now called the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients 
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When the OPTN was first established, membership in the network was voluntary and only few 
OPOs and transplant hospitals participated. Without participation of all OPOs and hospitals, a nationally 
integrated network as envisioned under NOTA, could not be realized. Without a nationally integrated 
network, a large donor-recipient matching pool would not be available and all donated organs would not be 
transplanted. To address this issue, the Social Security Act was amended through the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1986 (Public Law 99–509) to require “hospitals that perform organ transplants to be 
members of and abide by the rules and requirements of the OPTN as a condition for participation in the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs” (Public Law 99–509). The amendment also required that “to be eligible 
for reimbursement of organ procurement costs by Medicare or Medicaid an OPO must be a member of and 
abide by the rules and requirements of the OPTN” (Public Law 99–509).  
In 1987, the Uniform Law Commission revised the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to address the 
changes in circumstance and practice of organ procurement and transplantation since the 1968 law [40]. 
Specifically, this version of the law reaffirmed the prohibition on sale of organs; guaranteed priority of the 
donor’s wishes over the wishes of family members; required that hospitals make routine inquiry regarding 
the intention to donate; and permitted medical examiners to authorize organ recovery from decedents in 
their custody who didn’t have next-of-kin [44]. The last provision was contentious leading to considerable 
resistance from several states. Only 26 states adopted the 1987 legislation and the remaining states enacted 
only parts of this legislation (especially pertaining to routine inquiry) leading to significant dissimilarities 
in the practice of organ procurement across the country [44].  
By this time, it had also become apparent that there was a need to clarify the “rules and 
requirements of the OPTN” as set forth in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986. In 1989, the 
Health Care Financing Administration9 (HCFA) published an administrative rule in the Federal Register 
(54 FR 51802) clarifying that OPTN policies (42 CFR Part 121) must be formally approved by the Secretary 
9 Now called the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
12 
                                                     
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to be considered “rules and requirements” under the above 
mentioned amendment to the Social Security Act. Thus OPOs and hospitals in violation of OPTN’s policies 
not approved by the Secretary as rules and requirements did not fall out of compliance under the Social 
Security Act for reimbursement of organ procurement and transplantation costs. In essence, the new 
administrative rule trimmed down OPTN’s power to enforce compliance with its policies. 
In 1991, a national workshop on increasing organ donation convened by Surgeon General Antonia 
Novella concluded that “stronger efforts were needed to ensure compliance with existing routine inquiry 
and required request laws….. Unfortunately, most State laws contain neither provisions nor monies to 
assure adequate compliance” [45]. In 1998, HCFA published a final rule for organ, tissue and eye donation 
(63 Federal Register 33875) as part of the revised Medicare and Medicaid Conditions of Participation for 
Hospitals (42 CFR Part 482). To facilitate best practices for increasing organ donation, two key 
requirements were added to the conditions of participation. First, hospitals must refer imminent death and 
deceased patients to their OPO in a timely manner. Second, only OPO staff or a trained hospital staff may 
approach families about organ donation. For the critical care staff, the new requirements were a departure 
from their traditional role. Lacking experience on this front, many hospitals struggled to implement the 
referral and request requirements.  
In 2000, to facilitate compliance with the new rules, Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA) published a resource guide to aid hospitals in developing training programs for referral and request 
procedures [46]. In the same year, the Organ Procurement Organization Certification Act of 2000 (Public 
Law 106-505 Sec. 701) established requirements for certification of the OPOs to receive grants from the 
Secretary of HHS and participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs.  
In 2001, Secretary Tommy G. Thompson of Health and Human Services launched the Gift of Life 
Donation Initiative with a focus on increasing organ donation rates across the country. Noteworthy 
programs in the initiative included “Workplace Partnership for Life”, “National Forum on Donor 
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Registries”, “National Gift of Life Medal”, “Driver’s Education Curriculum”, and “Model Donor Card” 
[47]. The initiative also enjoyed broad support in the community with the Coalition on Donation, the 
Advertising Council, the American Medical Association, state law associations, several educational and 
religious organizations, and donor and recipient groups actively partnering in the initiative [47].  
A more recent and perhaps the most popular component of Secretary Thompson’s initiative is the 
Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative. The Collaborative is modelled on the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement’s 10  breakthrough series. This approach expedites acquisition of new knowledge, its 
dissemination and widespread replication across organizations participating in the collaborative [48]. The 
Collaborative began in September 2003 with the primary goal of increasing the average conversion rate11 
from the then current average of 43% to 75% [49]. Through site visits and interviewing professionals from 
6 OPOs and 16 hospitals known to have highest donation rates, 15 best practices were identified and 
disseminated to other participating OPOs and hospitals. By sharing experiences, collective problem-solving 
exercises and celebrating success together, a community of OPOs and hospitals committed to quality 
improvement has emerged. As a result, considerable increase in the number of organs available for 
transplantation has been realized since the collaborative began [50]. From October 2003 to September 2006, 
the number of organ donors increased by 22%, four times faster than preceding three years [51]. Hospitals 
that participated in the collaborative experienced an eight percentage point increase in donation rates from 
52% to 60% while donation rates at non-participating hospitals remained unchanged at 51% [52]. Out of 
the 95 participating hospitals, 36 achieved a 75% conversion rate by April 2005 [53]. Some OPOs 
experienced increase in consent rates, albeit at one or two hospitals [54].  
In 2006 after the collaborative ended, the Organ Donation and Transplantation Alliance12 was 
established as a non-profit, independent organization to further capitalize on the gains realized through the 
10 www.ihi.org  
11 Conversion rate is defined as the proportion of eligible decedents that become actual donors. This metric is discussed 
in greater detail in the next section. 
12 http://www.organdonationalliance.org  
14 
                                                     
collaborative [55]. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) partners with the alliance to disseminate best practices through the Donation and 
Transplantation Community of Practice (DTCP) [7]. The goal of the DTCP is to help OPOs and hospitals 
institutionalize the identified best practices. This is accomplished through web-based education13 and 
interactive approaches like Donation Service Area Teams and Regional Collaborative Teams [7]. In 
addition, HRSA also organizes leadership meetings involving hospital CEOs and OPO presidents, task 
forces and national events like the National Learning Congress to sustain the quality improvement work 
[7]. 
In 2006, the Uniform Law Commission approved a new version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act to address the uneven adoption of the 1987 version and to harmonize it with the federal and state 
regulations governing the organ procurement system. The 2006 version underscored the finality of donor’s 
anatomical gift by barring others from overriding the individual’s decision to donate [56]. The legislation 
also recognized organ donor designation on driver’s licenses, donor registration cards, and those listed in 
living wills as legally binding first-person authorizations. It further clarified the priority list of individuals 
who can authorize donation on behalf of the deceased. Importantly, the 2006 UAGA prohibited the coroners 
and the medical examiners from making anatomical gifts unless the authority to dispose of the decedent’s 
body rests in them [56]. At present, all states except Delaware, Florida, New York and Pennsylvania have 
adopted the 2006 version. The Act is under review for adoption in Pennsylvania (2014) where the 1987 
version is in effect at present [56]. 
In May 2006, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services published the final rule (71 Federal 
Register 30928) on Conditions for Coverage for Organ Procurement Organizations (42 CFR Parts 413, 441, 486 
& 498). The final rule set following process requirements for the OPOs as conditions for coverage under the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. First, OPOs have written agreement with hospitals defining the roles and 
13 www.healthcarecommunities.org  
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responsibilities of each in the organ procurement process (§486.322). Second, OPOs make cooperative 
arrangements with tissue banks that have agreement with hospitals with which the OPO also has an agreement 
(§486.322). Third, OPOs provide individually-identifiable hospital specific data on organ donation and 
transplantation to the OPTN (§486.328), Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients and HHS. Fourth, the 
OPOs assume responsibility for identification of potential donors, requesting authorization (§486.342), 
evaluating and managing potential donors (§486.344), organ recovery (§486.344), organ preservation and 
transport (§486.346), and organ allocation (§486.344). Thence the role of the OPO as a bridge between donor 
hospitals and transplant centers was well established through the final rule. 
The U.S. organ procurement system is balanced on three fundamental legislative pillars- the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, the Uniform Determination of Death Act and the National Organ Transplant 
Act. Numerous amendments, and DHHS rules and regulations (e.g., CMS Conditions of Participation) have 
refined these laws and facilitate compliance. In section 1.4, we describe the current form of the organ 
procurement system and the central role that organ procurement organizations play in this system. Two 
core activities of the organ procurement organizations, clinical services and public education, serve as the 
conceptual framework for studies 1 and 2. Study 3 will build on the results of study 2. 
1.4. THE ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK 
The health benefit from organ transplants is a function of two processes. The more conspicuous 
process at the “front end” is where organs are surgically transplanted into patients suffering from end-
stage organ failure. The surgical procedure is carried out at hospitals with specialized transplant programs 
and by highly skilled surgeons. Less noticeable, at the “back end” is the organ procurement process that 
involves making viable organs available for transplantation. While any hospital may have a potential donor, 
specialized hospitals with emergency and critical care facilities that see patients with traumatic head injuries 
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or terminally ill patients are the most likely source of organ donors. Most transplant centers also care for 
such patients and are a source of donated organs but the need to match organs with recipients necessitates 
dependence on other “donor hospitals”. It is for this reason that many transplant centers operated in-house 
organ procurement centers before the OPTN came into existence. Nevertheless the supply of viable organs 
through these procurement centers has been limited by the small network of regional donor hospitals that 
have had no incentives to make organs available for transplants.  
In 1984, the National Organ Transplant Act established the OPTN as a nationally integrated system 
to overcome the “regional” network barrier. In addition, the CMS Conditions of Participation (42 CFR 
482.5) required hospitals to identify donors and help procure organs for transplant centers. Also established 
under NOTA, organ procurement organizations assumed the role of procurement centers to facilitate the 
flow of viable organs from donor hospitals to transplant centers. The CMS Conditions for Coverage for the 
OPOs (42 CFR Parts 413, 441, 486 & 498,) and Conditions of Participation for the Hospitals (42 CFR Part 
482) govern the OPTN activities of the respective organizations for compliance with public laws. These 
final rules that set forth the conditions for reimbursement under the Medicare and Medicaid programs form 
the “regulatory backbone” of the whole OPTN operation.  
The OPTN is a public-private partnership that enables all professionals involved in the donation 
and transplantation system to interact and coordinate organ sharing 24 hours a day. By facilitating 
communication across a large geographic area, the OPTN serves to improve effectiveness, efficiency, and 
equity in organ sharing nationwide and consequently increase the supply of donated organs. The OPTN 
operates the national database of all patients in the U.S. waiting for a transplant. In addition, the OPTN 
develops policies and procedures for organ recovery and allocation, and evaluates the OPOs and transplant 
centers for compliance.  
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The contract for the operation of the OPTN was awarded in 1986 [39] to Richmond-based private, 
not-for-profit organization called the United Network for Organ Sharing14 [47]. As a move towards a “fast, 
reliable system to match organs to patient” UNOS started using an internet-based system called UNet in 
1999 to connect transplant hospitals and OPOs together [57]. UNet allows transplant hospitals to list 
patients on the transplant waiting list, complete and submit OPTN data forms, status justification forms and 
access reports in a real-time, secure, and a confidential environment. The OPOs use UNet to add donors 
and run donor-recipient matching lists. Donated organs are also offered to transplant centers through UNet.  
1.5. ORGAN PROCURMEENT ORGANIZATIONS 
OPOs are federally designated, not-for-profit organizations established under the NOTA as 
bridging organizations between donor hospitals and transplant centers. At present, there are 58 OPOs 
throughout the United States [58]. Eight of these OPOs are hospital-based with the remainder being 
independent [58]. Each OPO serves an exclusive geographical region known as a donation service area 
(DSA). The size of the DSA depends on the geography, population and rural-urban character of the region 
and varies greatly among the OPOs. LifeCenter Northwest, for instance, has the largest DSA in the country 
spanning across all of Alaska and Montana, almost all of Washington and parts of Idaho serving an area of 
over 800,000 square miles [59]. LifeLink of Puerto Rico, on the other hand, has the smallest DSA in the 
country with an area of 3,557 square miles [60].  
In addition to recovery of solid organs, most OPOs are involved in tissue and cornea recovery. 
OPOs employ variable staffing approach to address the unique challenges that their DSA’s geography and 
healthcare system pose. OPOs with a smaller DSA typically carry out their operations from one center. 
14 www.unos.org  
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Those with DSAs spanning multiple states may also have regional offices. While most donor hospitals are 
served by OPO professionals operating from the OPO’s office, OPOs maintain permanent presence at Level 
1 trauma centers through in-house coordinators. Number of employees at any OPO is largely determined 
by the population it serves and the number of hospitals in its DSA [61]. Due to inherent demographic 
differences among DSA’s, the donation and organ recovery rates vary widely across the OPOs. In 2004, 
the donation rate varied from 34.3 percent of eligible deaths to 77.9 percent of eligible deaths [61]. In 2011, 
organs recovered per donor ranged from 2.91 to 4.19 [62].  
1.5.1.  The Center for Organ Recovery and Education 
The Center for Organ Recovery and Education (CORE) is the OPO that serves western 
Pennsylvania and almost all of West Virginia. Founded in 1977, CORE is headquartered in Pittsburgh, PA 
with a regional office in Charleston, WV. Its region encompasses 155 hospitals serving 5.5 million people 
across 32 counties in Pennsylvania, 50 counties in West Virginia and Chemung County in New York [63]. 
CORE’s DSA covers 45,905 square miles and is the 22nd largest in the country [64]. Each hospital in 
CORE’s DSA serves as a source of organ donors. In addition, five of these hospitals also have transplant 
program: Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, UPMC Presbyterian, Veterans Administration Medical Center; 
Allegheny General Hospital, and Charleston Area Medical Center in West Virginia. UPMC Presbyterian 
and Allegheny General Hospitals also have the highest donation potential in CORE’s DSA. CORE 
maintains permanent presence in these hospitals through in-house coordinators [65]. While most organs are 
transplanted locally, organs recovered by CORE are transplanted regionally and nationally. In 2013, one 
liver recovered by CORE was transplanted as far away as San Francisco, California [64].  
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1.5.2.  OPO Performance Assessment and Certification 
In addition to the process requirements, the Organ Procurement Organization Certification Act of 
2000 (Public Law 106-505 Sec. 701) also establishes performance requirements for certification of the 
OPOs to receive grants from the Secretary of HHS and participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
OPOs are certified every four years. The certification process relies on multiple outcome measures set forth 
in the CMS Conditions for Coverage for OPOs (42 CFR §486.318). OPOs are assessed on three outcome 
measures: 1) donation rate; 2) observed over expected donation rate; and 3) organs transplanted per donor, 
and organs used for research per donor.  
Donation Rate. Donation rate is the number of eligible donors (actual donors) divided by the 
number of eligible deaths. An eligible death for organ donation is defined as a patient 70 years old or 
younger, who is legally declared brain dead, and who does not exhibit any of the exclusionary conditions 
listed in 42 CFR §486.302. These conditions are also listed in Appendix A of this dissertation. This outcome 
measure allows CMS to assess how well has an OPO performed with regard to the donation potential of its 
service area, as well as, how well it has performed when compared to other OPOs. When comparing an 
OPO’s donation rate to other OPOs (the national average), only the standard criteria donors15 are considered 
in the assessment. In this case, the donate rate is defined as the number of SCDs divided by the number of 
eligible deaths. When an OPO’s performance is assessed with regard to the donation potential of its service 
area, donors after cardiac death16 and expanded criteria donors17 are also considered. In this case, the 
number of DCDs and ECDs are added to the number of SCDs in the numerator and to the number of eligible 
deaths in the denominator. The two separate definitions of the donation rate serve two goals. First, for 
15 Standard criteria donors (SCD) are actual donors who meet the eligible death criteria. 
16 Donors after cardiac death (DCD) are declared dead using the circulatory determination of death criteria. According 
to the Uniform Determination of Death Act, death can be declared using the neurologic criteria (SCD or ECD) or the 
cardiorespiratory criteria (DCD). 
17 Expanded criteria donors (ECD) are donors that do not fit either the SCD or DCD definition of donors. CMS 
purposely uses a broad definition of ECD since technological advancements in transplantation field can make narrower 
definition obsolete.  
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comparison with national average, OPOs with a limited potential for DCD and ECD are not penalized. 
Second, all OPOs are nevertheless incentivized to improve DCD and ECD donation rates and expand the 
donor pool.  
Observed over Expected Donation Rate. The second outcome measure provides an independent 
statistical assessment of each OPO’s performance by calculating an expected donation rate using the 
statistical methodology developed by the SRTR. SRTR methodology uses hospital characteristics to 
determine the expected donation rate for each OPO: Level I or Level II trauma center, size of the 
metropolitan statistical area, CMS case-mix index, total number of all beds, number of ICU beds, primary 
service, availability of neurosurgical services, and hospital control or ownership [66, 67]. The expected 
referral rate18 for each OPO is also adjusted for its area-specific hospital characteristics and is used to 
calculate the expected number of eligible deaths. A ratio of the observed over expected donation rate is 
calculated with a ratio greater than 1 signifying better than expected performance and vice versa. To meet 
this performance standard the observed donation rate of an OPO must not be significantly less than the 
expected donation rate for its service area at a probability level of 0.05. 
Organs Transplanted per Donor. This outcome measure provides an assessment of the extent to 
which OPOs are able to achieve the ultimate goal of providing organs for transplantation. To be recertified, 
CMS requires that OPOs do not fall 1 standard deviation below the national mean, averaged over 3 years 
during the recertification cycle, on at least two of the following three measures: 1) number of organs 
transplanted per standard criteria donor; 2) number of organs transplanted per expanded criteria donor; and 
3) number of organs used for research per donor.  
If an OPO fails to meet the performance standards, the OPO is required to file a corrective action 
plan with a three-year grace period to implement the plan. During the grace period, the OPO does not risk 
decertification. However, if the OPO still fails to meet the performance standards, the OPO loses 
18 Referral rate is the percentage of deaths that are referred to the OPO. 
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certification and its service area is opened to auction for other OPOs. The affected OPO can appeal the 
decertification to the Secretary on substantive and procedural grounds.  
1.5.3.  Functions of OPOs 
The Association of Organ Procurement Organizations identifies four core functions of an OPO 
[58]. Under clinical services, OPO professionals provide support to potential donors’ families throughout 
the dying process. These professionals are available at all times to ensure that patients’ donation decisions 
are honored. In addition, these professionals collaborate with the hospital’s staff to maintain the donor’s 
organ function, evaluate the medical suitability of the potential donor, offer families the opportunity for 
organ donation, match organs with recipients through the OPTN and coordinate surgical recovery of 
donated organs.  
Hospital development involves professionals who act as a liaison with the hospitals in the OPOs 
service area. These “professional services liaisons” (PSLs) provide education and training to the hospital 
personnel who are involved in the donation process. Training programs are tailored to the role that each 
hospital employee plays in the donation process. In addition, these professionals are responsible for 
developing effective communication plans and strong relationship with their hospitals. The goal of these 
activities is to build strong partnership with the donor hospitals and eliminate errors that may jeopardize 
potential for donation.  
Under donor family services, OPOs offer bereavement services to the families of donors including 
a library of resources available to the family members; and a quiet room to meditate, read and create 
memory quilt squares, scrapbooks or photo albums. Many OPOs hold annual remembrance events for the 
donor families or make their staff available to listen to and support donor families throughout the 
bereavement process. These activities aim to honor the donors and build public trust. OPOs also connect 
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donor families with recipients of organ transplants through letters or in some circumstances through in-
person meetings.  
Through public education efforts, OPOs strive to increase awareness about organ donation. These 
efforts include mass media campaigns on radio, TV and print; and interpersonal campaigns at faith-based 
events, youth festivals, sporting events, driver’s license bureaus, workplaces and other community events. 
The goal of the outreach is to encourage people in the communities they serve to join the state donor 
registry.  
1.5.4.  Clinical Services- the Organ Donation Process 
Clinical services include all OPO interactions with a donor hospital that directly result in 
procurement of organs for transplant. Before organs can be recovered, a complex set of procedures must be 
executed to ensure that patients who have the potential to donate organs become donors on death. This set 
of procedures is known as the organ donation process. The organ donation process is typically housed in 
the critical care unit where patients with catastrophic brain injuries or who are terminally ill, are cared for. 
This process is the single most important determinant of whether organs will be recovered from a potential 
donor. Consequently, this process has received most attention from policymakers.  
 “[E]very system is perfectly designed to achieve the results it achieves” [68]. Thus the system must 
be redesigned if different results are desired. Critical care units have historically operated with the goal of 
caring for the sickest patients rather than procuring organs. Since the organ donation process essentially 
begins with the critical care staff notifying the OPO, lack of attention to prompt identification of potential 
donors and referral has resulted in numerous opportunities for donation being lost over the years. For 
instance in 1990, Gortmarker et al. estimated that 27 percent of donors were lost because they were not 
identified [69]. Sheehy et al. estimated that between 1997 and 1999, 20 percent of patients with catastrophic 
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brain injuries (those best suited for organ donation) were not referred to the OPOs [70]. To address this 
problem, the breakthrough collaborative in 2003 recommended that the critical care system be redesigned 
to incorporate the organ donation process into the routine roles and responsibilities of the critical care staff 
[49]. Observing that the organ donation process and end-of-life care share a common framework of respect 
and compassion for patients and their families, the Institute of Medicine has reaffirmed that the organ 
donation process should be seamlessly integrated into end-of-life care [71].  
The organ donation process is initiated when a terminally ill patient is identified to be at risk of 
imminent death. Figure 2 presents a schematic of the organ donation process employed in all hospitals that 
fall in CORE’s service area. As the schematic suggests, the process is not strictly linear as several 
components of the process overlap in time. For convenience, the organ donation process is described under 
six topic areas: 1) identification and referral; 2) evaluating medical suitability; 3) authorization for donation; 
4) determination of death; 5) donor management; and 6) recovery and allocation.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The organ donation process 
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1.5.4.1.  Identification of Imminent Death and Timely Referral to the OPO 
In compliance with the CMS Conditions of Participation, all hospitals in the U.S. are required to 
identify patients whose death is “imminent” or have died and report them to the regional OPO within 1 
hour of determination. The purpose of this regulation and associated state and federal laws is to maximize 
success of organ transplantation by timely identification and referral of the potential donor, which allows 
for appropriate donor family support and optimum donor management. 
The Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation recommends following guidelines for 
diagnosis of imminent death [72]: 
 A patient with severe, acute brain injury: 
Who requires mechanical ventilation; AND 
Is in an Intensive Care Unit or Emergency Department; AND 
Has clinical findings consistent with a Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) that is less than or equal to a 
mutually-agreed-upon threshold; OR 
For whom physicians are evaluating a diagnosis of brain death; OR 
For whom a physician has ordered that life sustaining therapies be withdrawn, pursuant to the 
family’s decision. 
The Glasgow Coma Scale is provided in Appendix B. In CORE’s service area, these guidelines are 
operationalized through the use of trigger cards. CORE emphasizes that all hospitals anticipate imminent 
death and promptly refer the patient to CORE. In CORE’s donation service area, a patient meeting any of 
the criteria presented in Table 1 will trigger a referral. 
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Table 1: Imminent death criteria used by CORE 
• Death expected within 24 to 48 hours. 
• Patient has suffered severe, irreversible brain injury. 
• A Glasgow Coma Scale score of 5 or less. 
• Anoxia secondary to cardiac arrest. 
• Change in medical care protocol from active treatment to “Do Not Resuscitate” 
or “Comfort Only” or “De-escalation of Care” being considered. 
 
 
Referrals are generally made through a phone call to CORE’s donor referral center that operates 
24-hours a day. When CORE receives a phone call, a set of standard procedures is initiated.  First, the 
identities of the referring organization and the potential donor are established and verified. Next, the referral 
center executive queries the state donor registry to determine if the patient has registered as an organ donor. 
At the same time, the patient is preliminarily screened for conditions that might rule out prospects of organ 
donation and at the same time determine if the potential donor will be a standard, cardiac death or expanded 
criteria donor. The exclusionary conditions are listed in CMS Conditions of Coverage for the OPOs as well 
as Appendix A of this dissertation. If the patient clears preliminary screening, an organ procurement 
coordinator (OPC), who is a highly trained medical representative from CORE is assigned to the case. 
While the procurement coordinator is not involved in patient’s care, this person is responsible for all 
procedures that must be carried out to preserve the opportunity for organ donation. These procedures 
include detailed medical evaluation of the potential donor, offering support to the family, requesting the 
family to authorize donation (if the patient is not already on the donor registry), and donor management. In 
addition, the procurement coordinator is also responsible for coordinating with the organ recovery team, 
organ preservation and allocation. 
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1.5.4.2.  Evaluating Medical Suitability 
All activities to determine medical suitability of the donor are governed by the OPTN Policies (42 
CFR 121) [73]. Each OPO must establish acceptance criteria for deceased donors and organs, and evaluate 
potential donors for fulfillment of those criteria. Once the OPC is assigned the case, the process of 
evaluating the patient’s medical suitability for donating organs is initiated. The goals of the medical 
suitability evaluation are: 1) to identify conditions that may make the potential donor ineligible; 2) to 
determine risk of infections and employ strategies to alleviate that risk by treating the donor for the 
infection; and 3) to implement preventive measures including vaccination in the potential recipient [74].  
Medical and Behavioral History. OPTN requires that the medical history includes each of the 
following: 1) laboratory tests and results used to identify transmissible disease, treated and untreated, that 
if transmitted will adversely impact the recipient; 2) factors that are associated with increased risk of 
infectious disease transmission including HIV, HBV and HCV; and 3) prior exposure to Human Pituitary 
Derived Growth Hormone to determine the risk of prion disease. In addition, obtaining information on 
vaccination status, residence or travel to disease endemic areas, drug use, risky sexual behavior and 
incarceration are also recommended [75]. Identified infections, if any, do not automatically preclude 
transplantation in all cases and in all infections. The urgency of the recipient’s need and the recipient’s 
infection status are also factored in while making a decision to accept or reject the organ. For instance, if 
the donor is HCV positive and the recipient is negative, the organ is rejected. But if the donor and recipient 
are HCV positive, the organ can be accepted for transplant. The medical and behavioral history is obtained 
from the patient’s medical records and from interviewing close associates. For donors less than 18 months 
old, history of the potential donor and the mother is recorded.  
Hemodilution Assessment. All donor serological screening tests must be performed on non-
hemodiluted samples to preclude altered serological test results. The extent of hemodilution is determined 
from the medical record detailing all blood products and intravenous fluid transfusions that the potential 
27 
donor has received since admission. In addition, the OPO assesses all blood samples obtained for serology 
screening for the extent of hemodilution using a U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved 
hemodilution calculation. For infants younger than 3 months old with diluted blood, serology tests can be 
performed using the blood from the biological mother. 
Serology Screening and Blood Typing. Most OPOs operate an in-house laboratory to run serology 
tests and blood typing on potential donors. Given the uncertainty about when a potential donor may become 
available and the short timeframe within which medical evaluation must be completed, laboratories 
involved in potential donor serological screening are operated 24 hours. Blood samples from the potential 
donor are tested for blood type and subtype. In order to prevent donor-recipient blood type mismatch, OPTN 
employs stringent reporting requirements on blood typing. These include primary reporting and secondary 
reporting (by an individual other than the one who entered the primary reports) to UNet. There is consensus 
among the transplantation community that routine serological screening of potential organ donors should 
include testing for HIV, human T lymphotropic virus, hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C virus, and cytomegalovirus 
[76].  
 
1.5.4.3.  Authorization for Donation 
Authorization for organ donation is governed by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968 (revised 
1987, 2006). According to this act, organs can be donated either through first-person authorization or next-
of-kin authorization.  
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First-person Authorization 
First-person authorization for donation (authorization by the donor himself or herself) documents 
an individual’s desire to make the anatomical gift and requires no further confirmation from the next-of-
kin. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act protects the right of individuals to donate their organs and requires 
that OPOs and hospitals honor the decedent’s wishes. An individual can authorize organ donation either 
through filling a donor card, registering online, designation on driver’s license or state ID, or by executing 
a living will. The most common method is to join a state donor registry when renewing a driver’s license 
or state ID. While the driver’s license/state ID may display an individual’s designation status, the actual 
registration is in a state operated secure database. According to the Donor Designation Collaborative, the 
design of the registry plays an important role in its effectiveness [77]. Several design factors have been 
identified that determine whether a donor registry is effective. These criteria are listed in Appendix C. When 
an imminent death patient is referred to the OPO, the donor referral coordinator queries the state donor 
registry to determine the patient’s donor designation status. If the patient is a designated donor and 
medically suitable for donation, the OPO is legally obligated to honor the donor’s wish. 
 
Next-of-kin Authorization 
Next-of-kin authorization is only considered if the potential donor is medically suitable to donate 
and if there is no evidence of first-person authorization. While requesting authorization, the procurement 
coordinator provides all possible donation options; discusses the impact of donation on funeral 
arrangements; gives a general description of the recovery process; and explains that the family will not 
incur any cost for donation.  Institutional support personnel including social workers, a chaplain and nursing 
staff are involved as appropriate. Two important considerations for this type of authorization are: 1) the 
individual to be approached for authorization; and 2) the timing of the request for donation. 
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Individual to be approached for authorization: The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) 
establishes the order of priority in which the next-of-kin are approached for organ donation conversation. 
According to UAGA, “an anatomical gift of a decedent’s body or part for purpose of transplantation, 
therapy, research, or education may be made by any member of the following classes of persons who is 
reasonably available, in the order of priority listed: 
(1) an agent of the decedent at the time of death who could have made an anatomical gift 
immediately before the decedent’s death;  
(2) the spouse of the decedent;  
(3) adult children of the decedent;  
(4) parents of the decedent;  
(5) adult siblings of the decedent;  
(6) adult grandchildren of the decedent;  
(7) grandparents of the decedent; 
(8) an adult who exhibited special care and concern for the decedent;  
(9) the persons who were acting as the [guardians] of the person of the decedent at the time of 
death; and  
(10) any other person having the authority to dispose of the decedent’s body.”  
UAGA requires OPOs to make reasonable efforts to approach the highest order next-of-kin, and if 
not available, move down the order to the next available next-of-kin. Further, “A person may not make an 
anatomical gift if, at the time of the decedent’s death, a person in a prior class under subsection (a) is 
reasonably available to make or to object to the making of an anatomical gift.” If two or more individuals 
are in the same class, consensus of the absolute majority is required for authorization.  
Timing of the authorization request: The OPO community believes that timing of the organ 
donation request is crucial and that the request for authorization should be “decoupled” from the news that 
the family’s loved one has died. Decoupling refers to the temporal separation of pronouncement of death 
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from the request for donation. Bartucci and Bishop recommend that request for organ donation to be made 
only after the family has had sufficient time to accept the death of their loved one [78]. Rudy et al. also 
suggest similar disconnect in the pronouncement of death and request for donation [79]. Empirical evidence 
testing this notion however is mixed but suggestive of a weak effect of timing on authorization. Garrison et 
al. have found that the family authorization rate increased from 18% to 61% when the request for donation 
was made separate from the time of explanation of death [80]. Cutler et al. also found that authorization 
was more likely if the request was made after death was pronounced (78%) than if the request for donation 
was made either before (60%) or at the time of pronouncement of death (58%) [81]. Morris et al. however 
have found no difference in the authorization rate whether the request for donation was made immediately 
after, within 12 hours, or after 12 hours of pronouncement of death [82]. Niles and Mattice found that 
authorization rates were similar when the request for donation was made either before (62%) or after (57%) 
the pronouncement of death but they differed significantly from request made at the time of pronouncement 
of death (25%) [83]. In a multivariate analysis, Siminoff et al. found that donation rates did not differ 
significantly regardless of whether the request was made before (51%), concurrently (63%), or after (57%) 
death was pronounced [84]. Nevertheless, it is a common practice among the OPOs to decouple the request 
for donation from pronouncement of death. 
1.5.4.4.  Determining Death 
A fundamental premise of organ donation is the dead-donor rule that requires that donors must be 
dead before their vital organs can be recovered. The Uniform Determination of Death Act sets forth a broad 
physiologic definition of death: An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead [42]. Because protocols and procedures to recover organs from individuals 
declared dead using the two criteria are different, the Institute of Medicine has recommended the use of 
“donation after neurologic determination of death” and “donation after circulatory determination of death” 
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respectively to distinguish between the two in context of organ donation [71]. Brain death testing and 
neurologic determination of death are used interchangeably for convenience.  
 
Neurologic Determination of Death 
In the United States, the Uniform Determination of Death Act sets the general legal standard for 
neurologic determination of death but the law does not establish the clinical criteria for this determination. 
The Quality Standards Subcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology has developed the clinical 
criteria for neurologic determination of death, which are detailed in the 1995 American Academy of 
Neurology Practice Parameters [85]. Brain death is defined as the “irreversible loss of all brain functions 
including brain stem reflexes” [85]. Brain death is frequently a result of severe head injury or aneurysmal 
subarachnoid hemorrhage [85]. 
Since declaration of death is irrevocable, brain death determination involves a rigorous examination 
to see if the patient meets the clinical criteria for brain death diagnosis. Determining death using the 
neurologic criteria involves at least one comprehensive neurologic exam after a prolonged observation 
period, to exclude any possibility of neurologic recovery. There is extensive variation in the recommended 
length of observation period worldwide and evidence on minimally acceptable observation period is 
insufficient [86]. While the observation period can vary on case-by-case basis, a period of at least 24 hours 
is recommended when the cause of coma is undetermined [87]. Brain death diagnosis is made by physicians 
who have evaluated the medical history of the patient and completed the neurologic examination. Some 
states including Pennsylvania and West Virginia require a second comprehensive neurologic examination. 
Although the same physician may do both exams, hospitals often require different physicians to conduct 
the two exams. The importance of the second neurologic exam lies in establishing the irreversibility of the 
condition determined during the first exam. While the intervening period between the two exams is 
arbitrary, a period of 6 hours is considered reasonable [85]. In children (37 weeks to 18 years), the 
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recommended observation period is longer (12 hours for 1 year or older to 48 hours for 7 days to 2 months 
old) [88]. The clinical criteria are listed in Appendix D.   
 
Circulatory Determination of Death 
Donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD) is considered in cases where: 1) the 
neurologic criteria cannot be fulfilled in spite of the presence of catastrophic brain injury and the patient’s 
family has requested withdrawal of life support; or 2) when neurologic determination of death cannot be 
made due to severe hemodynamic instability [71, 89]. In either case, there is no expectation of meaningful 
survival in patients being considered for circulatory determination of death [90, 91]. At this time, the OPC 
talks to the family about the process of withdrawing life-support and the opportunity for organ donation. If 
the patient is a designated organ donor or if the family authorizes donation, the patient is evaluated for the 
likelihood of passing away within 60 minutes. This evaluation involves several assessments including the 
T-piece trail.  
In general, the exact set of procedures to be followed during the withdrawal of ventilator support 
is governed by individual hospital policies. CORE gets involved only if donation is anticipated. In CORE’s 
DSA, hospitals follow the Pittsburgh Protocol19 for donation after circulatory determination of death [92]. 
The patient is taken to the operating room and comfort measures are provided. The attending physician 
from the hospital is in charge of withdrawal of support. Once the physician deems that the patient is 
comfortable, ventilator and oxygen perfusion support is withdrawn. Death is pronounced two minutes after 
loss of pulse, apnea, and unresponsiveness to noxious stimuli.   
19 University of Pittsburgh Medical Center policy and procedure manual. Management of terminally ill patients who 
may become organ donors after death. 
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The two minute period has invited mixed reactions. Critics argue that some patients can be 
resuscitated even at two minutes after cardiorespiratory arrest, thus the cessation of cardiopulmonary 
function is not irreversible and the patient is not dead by the legal definition [93]. However, those in support 
of the protocol have argued that resuscitation in such patients is contrary to patients’ wishes since the 
patients (or their surrogate decision makers) have requested withdrawal of life support [94]. For this reason, 
the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs20 views the loss of cardiopulmonary function in these patients 
as irreversible [95]. The Institute of Medicine has recommended that death should be pronounced 5 minutes 
after cardiorespiratory arrest [90]. The disadvantage of waiting this long is that organs begin to rapidly lose 
viability once oxygenation is lost after cardiopulmonary failure. Since there is no evidence that patients can 
auto-resuscitate after 2 minutes [23, 28], the Society of Critical Care Medicine and the American Society of 
Transplant Surgeons (ASTS) agree with a waiting period of two minutes to minimize warm ischemic insult 
to the organs and maximize their transplant potential [89, 96].  
Until the attending physician declares the patient dead, patient management continues to be under 
the control of the hospital and the recovery surgeon or team has no contact with the patient. When 
conflicting interests arise, as when a member of the transplant team shares patient care duties, the ASTS 
recommends that the transplant team member in such cases shall cede patient care responsibilities to 
someone who is not involved in the organ recovery/transplant process [89]. In some cases, the patient does 
not pass away in the expected time period after removal of ventilator support. In such cases, the donation 
process is aborted and the patient is returned to the intensive care unit or the ward and made comfortable 
[23, 90]. 
20 The American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
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1.5.4.5.  Donor Management 
Once the potential donor is declared dead, the OPC begins medical management of the potential 
donor to preserve organ viability. Systemic physiologic changes that accompany brain death occur as 
different parts of the brain undergo ischemic injury. Most common pathophysiologic conditions observed 
after brain death are hypotension, diabetes insipidus, disseminated intravascular coagulation, cardiac 
arrhythmias, pulmonary edema and metabolic acidosis [97]. These conditions are a result of a complex 
interaction of neural, hormonal and immunologic derangements that begin to precipitate as soon as the 
central nervous system activity ceases. Donor management ensures the viability of organs by minimizing 
the insult to the organs. In addition to delayed and poor graft function, cadaveric organs transplanted from 
improperly managed donor are more likely to fail due to increased and severe acute rejection by the host 
[98]. Evidence also suggests that long-term graft function may be determined by changes that occur early 
in death [98]. For these reasons, many OPOs and hospitals employ a more aggressive donor management 
protocol. In addition to early identification of a potential donor, and intensive care unit admission and 
management, donor management procedures are initiated regardless of authorization status of the donor 
[99]. For donation after circulatory determination of death, medications that improve quality of organs may 
be administered prior to death. The Institute of Medicine notes that while myths about these medications 
hastening or even causing death exist, these medications are considered to be safe by experts in the field 
[71].  
OPTN requires OPOs to make reasonable efforts to maintain adequate blood pressure for perfusion 
of organs; monitor the potential donor’s vital signs; administer IV therapy or drugs as required; administer 
antibiotic therapy when required; and administer and monitor fluid intake and output [73]. CORE uses a 
standard order set for donor management for the 155 hospitals in its DSA. Structured donor management 
protocols improve adherence to quality care and significantly increase the number of organs transplanted 
without compromising the quality of the organ [100]. The exact donor management guidelines and critical 
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care endpoints vary by the OPO, the hospital as well as the specific organs being recovered [101]. The goals 
of CORE’s donor management order set are to achieve a set of specific critical care endpoints. Specific 
donor management and the critical care endpoints that CORE uses are listed in Appendix E.  
1.5.4.6.  Organ Recovery and Allocation 
Almost all organs have already been designated for transplant to a specific recipient before organs 
are removed. Organs can be recovered only after authorization (either first-person or next-of-kin) has been 
obtained. For donors less than 18 years old, authorization from the parents must be obtained even if the 
potential donor is listed on the donor registry. OPTN prohibits the attending physician or the physician who 
declares the time of potential donor’s death from recovering the organs [73]. Organs are typically recovered 
by the transplant team in accordance with any specific requests for authorization including which organs 
may be recovered. Although specific processes in organ recovery may vary by the OPO, all organs are 
recovered using standard surgical techniques in a sterile environment. Flush solutions, additives and 
preservation media are made available for immediate extra-corporeal preservation. CORE maintains 
detailed operative notes on the recovery procedure. The organs are placed in sterile packaging and 
transported to the recipient’s transplant hospital. Organ abnormalities and surgical damage, if any, are also 
documented at this stage.  
The allocation process typically begins before organs are recovered to minimize the warm ischemic 
insult. Once an organ is deemed medically suitable for donation, the potential donor’s information is entered 
into UNet to match the donor’s organs with recipients on the transplant waiting list. Specific queries are 
run for each eligible organ. UNet then generates a priority list of waitlisted patients based on a number of 
suitability factors. These factors include geographical proximity of the recipient to the donor, time spent on 
the waiting list, potential recipient’s health status; and medical factors like physical characteristics of the 
donor and the recipient, HLA crossmatch, blood type and subtype. In addition, for each organ, allocation 
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policies differ in the impact that each factor has on where the potential recipients are placed on the priority 
match list. The most recent allocation policies in effect as of March 2012 are described in detail by Smith 
et al. for kidneys, pancreas and liver [102]; and Colvin-Adams et al. for lungs and heart [103]. Once the list 
is generated for each individual organ, the OPO offers the organ to the transplant program of the top-listed 
waiting list candidate. After the recipient’s transplant surgeon accepts the organ, an organ recovery surgery 
is arranged at the donor’s hospital.  
1.6. THE ORGAN DONATION CRITICAL PATHWAY 
Since the recommendations of the breakthrough collaborative, critical pathways for organ donation 
have evolved to maximize the quality of end-of-life care while preserving the opportunity for donation. 
Critical pathways help improve quality of care in high volume and high risk procedures [104]. In the context 
of organ donation, “high volume” means the organ donation process must be initiated every time a patient 
nears death. “High risk” signifies the high likelihood of losing viable organs if the donation process is not 
optimally timed and sequenced. Consistent with the definition of critical pathway set forth by Coffey et al. 
[104], the organ donation process involves comprehensive decision making by the healthcare team and the 
patient’s family, timely execution of interventions, collaboration between hospital and OPO staff, and case 
management of the donation aspect of patient care by the procurement coordinator. 
Adopted from the industry, the critical pathway approach was first employed in the U.S. healthcare 
in the 1980s during the time when prospective payment system was being implemented [104]. There is 
growing consensus worldwide that a standard critical pathway for organ donation can improve organ 
donation outcomes. In 2010, the Madrid Resolution on Organ Donation and Transplantation 21 
21 The Third World Health Organization Global Consultation on Organ Donation and Transplantation: Striving to 
Achieve Self-Sufficiency held in Madrid, Spain, on March 23–25, 2010. 
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recommended that the organ donation critical pathway be used internationally to facilitate donation in as 
many situations as possible [105]. In 2011, standardized critical pathways for organ donation were 
developed that could be used in healthcare settings worldwide [106].  
In the U.S., standardized protocols for organ donation have been jointly developed by the OPOs 
and their partnering hospitals. These protocols incorporate the best practices that are being continually 
identified and disseminated through the Donation and Transplantation Community of Practice and the 
National Learning Congress. Although OPOs and the critical care staff in the hospitals served by the OPOs 
work closely to adhere to the best practices, the complexity of critical care can sometimes lead to deviations 
from best practices. OPOs identify these deviations from best practices by different names including 
“process breakdown”, “deviation”, “process improvement area” etc. [107] and spend considerable 
resources in identifying and addressing them. This dissertation makes use of the term “process breakdown” 
to identify the deviation from best practice since this term is indicative of both, a disruption in the donation 
process as well as a breakdown in the OPO-hospital coordination. Process breakdown is a generic term 
applied to a set of failures in the donation process that can jeopardize the opportunity for donation. Table 2 
presents a list of process breakdowns that CORE identifies, records and resolves on a day-to-day basis as 
well as their consequence. While many process breakdowns including untimely referral, suboptimal request 
for donation, and early extubation are readily and objectively identifiable, others like inadequate donor 
management require some amount of subjective assessment.  
While several studies22 have identified a relationship between process breakdowns and conversion 
rate23, it is unclear how process breakdowns affect the supply of viable organs. In addition, existing 
literature does not account for other factors that affect donation rates. Chapter 2 examines these 
relationships while controlling for other factors that are known to affect organ donation.   
22 The studies are reviewed in the Discussion section of chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
23 Conversion rate is defined as the number of organ donors divided by the number of eligible deaths. This is discussed 
in detail in chapter 2 of the dissertation. 
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What is the effect of process breakdowns on availability of transplantable organs?
  
      …..Question 1  
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Table 2: Process breakdowns and their consequences 
Name Description Consequences 
Missed  
Referral 
The OPO was never notified about the 
deceased. Unaccounted patient deaths are 
found during medical/death record review. 
Any opportunity for donation is lost. 
Untimely 
Referral 
The OPO was not notified about the 
imminent death patient within 1 hour of 
determination.  
OPO gets less time to evaluate the 
donation potential and provide support 
to the donor family. Increases the risk of 
deceleration of care or early extubation 
(discussed in the table). 
Suboptimal 
Request for 
Donation 
Either the timing of the request is poor or 
the requestor is not the designated 
requestor. Poor timing of request include 
before or soon after the family is informed 
about patient’s death. 
The risk of family refusing to donate is 
significantly increased.  
Inadequate 
Donor 
Management 
Lack of hospital staff support in donor 
management. Potential donor’s metabolic 
derangement is not controlled. 
Organ viability is compromised. May 
potentially lead to less number of 
organs being transplanted from the 
donor. 
Deceleration of 
Care 
The referral is made timey but medical 
care is decelerated before the organ 
procurement coordinator becomes 
involved in the case. 
Either organ viability is compromised 
or donation opportunity is totally lost. 
Early Extubation 
Initial referral is made on time but the 
patient is withdrawn from the ventilator 
before the family is offered the opportunity 
to donate.  
Opportunity for donation is lost. 
Body released to 
funeral home 
The body is released to the funeral home 
without informing the OPO.  Opportunity for tissue donation is lost. 
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1.7. PUBLIC EDUCATION- ENCOURAGING DONOR DESIGNATION 
Evidence on the inefficiency of the national organ procurement system began to emerge as far back 
as in 1992. That year, Evans et al. estimated the efficiency of the organ procurement efforts between 37 
percent and 59 percent [108]. Recent evidence also suggests that the current shortage of organs is more 
likely due to the inefficiency in the procurement system rather than a limited potential donor pool. In each 
year between 1997 through 1999, there were an estimated 10,500 to 13,800 brain dead potential donors 
[70]. Yet there were no more than 5,824 deceased donors in any of these years [1]. The attrition in the 
potential donor pool is a result of successive loss of individuals at two stages in the organ donation process. 
First, there is a failure to identify patients at imminent risk of death or decedents with potential for donation. 
Second, potential donors are identified, referred, evaluated and managed appropriately but the family 
refuses to authorize donation.  
In 1990, Gortmarker et al. estimated that 27 percent of donors were lost because they were not 
identified and 52 percent of identified donors were lost because the family refused to donate organs [69]. 
To tackle this problem, in 1998, CMS Conditions of Participation (42 CFR Part 482.5) required that 
hospitals refer ALL imminent deaths and deceased patients to their OPO; and only OPO staff or a trained 
hospital staff may approach families about organ donation. Since the new requirements came into effect, 
the loss of donors because of missed identification has witnessed a 40 percent reduction from 27 percent in 
1990 to 16 percent in 1997-99 [69, 70]. However, the loss of donors because of family refusal has proven 
to be more resistant. Family authorization rate24  had only marginally improved from 48 percent in 1990 to 
54 percent in 1997-99 [69, 70]. Studies on interventions designed to improve authorization rates have 
reported mixed results. Beasley et al. reported no improvement in authorization rate after a 2-year 
intervention [109]. After placing an in-house coordinator in one hospital, Salim et al. observed an 
improvement in authorization rate from 35 percent to 52 percent [110]. Siminoff et al. reported a smaller 
24 Authorization rate is referred to as consent rate in the studies we cite.  
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improvement in authorization rate from 47 percent to 56 percent after educating OPCs in appropriate 
communication techniques [111]. Although these studies are not nationally representative, they consistently 
demonstrate that increasing authorization rate is a major challenge. In addition, Koh et al. in their evaluation 
of the Massachusetts Organ Donation Initiative have demonstrated the obstinate nature of family 
authorization rate [112]. Prior to the initiative in 1999, the authorization rate across 9 medical centers in 
Massachusetts was 59 percent [112]. In the second year of the initiative in 2001, the authorization rate 
increased to 67 percent. In 2003, two years after the initiative ended, the authorization rate dropped to 46 
percent [112]. 
There is considerable amount of evidence on the factors that influence a family’s decision to 
authorize donation [113-120]. These factors are listed as ‘barriers’ to family authorization along with the 
relevant studies in Table 3. Driven by the findings of the collaborative, the critical pathway approach was 
developed to address many of these barriers25. As a result, the family authorization rates have shown 
considerable imporvement in the last decade. Between November 2012 and October 2013, the national 
authorization rate was 74% [121]. Nevertheless, there remain several other barriers26 to authorization that 
cannot be addressed through the critical pathway approach. In fact these barriers are largely beyond the 
control of the hospital and the OPOs, and they continue to erode the organ donor pool. 
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is an effort to protect the donor pool from the effects of family 
refusal. According to this law, the document of anatomical gift is irrevocable other than by the individual. 
In addition, OPOs are under legal obligation to honor the donor’s wishes. Thus if a potential donor has 
executed the document of anatomical gift, the OPO does not need authorization for donation from the 
family. Donor designations are therefore crucial in reducing the shortage of organs. “A Donor Designation 
25 These barriers include perceived poor quality of care, poor explanation of brain death, suboptimal request for 
donation, perceived lack of support from the OPC and hospital staff, and poor understanding of organ donation 
process. 
26 These barriers include patient demographics, religious beliefs, no prior knowledge of the patient’s wishes, fear of 
mutilation, negative organ donation attitude, death from medical cause rather than trauma, family disagreement 
regarding donation decision, and family’s emotional state. These barriers are presented in Table 3. 
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is a documented, legally authorized commitment by an individual to make an anatomical gift that cannot 
be revoked by anyone other than the registered donor” [77]. While there are several mechanisms to register 
as an organ donor, only joining the state donor registry can guarantee that the designated donor’s wishes 
will be honored. A donor registry is a database of all individuals who have designated themselves as organ 
donors. Individuals can join the registry either online or through the department of motor vehicles during 
issuance/renewal of their state ID or driver’s license. State donor registries are secure databases typically 
maintained by the motor vehicle departments. To ensure security, registries can be accessed only by the 
state OPOs and only for imminent death patients or decedents who have been referred to the OPO.  
In spite of concerted efforts of the organ donation community to promote state donor registries, less 
than half of all Americans have signed up as organ donors. In 2012, there were only 108 million individuals 
on state donor registries nationwide, that is only 45 percent of all individuals 18 years and older [77]. While 
Pennsylvania is slightly better than the national average (46 percent), only 35 percent of individuals 18 
years and older are designated donors in West Virginia [77]. Thus there is a need to step up efforts to 
promote state donor registries nationally. DLA is actively involved in the promotion of donor registries and 
sets national goals for total designations. In recent years, HRSA has funded a large portfolio of research on 
innovative approaches to adding donors to the state registries. Both efforts are based on the premise that 
more donor designations will result in more organ donors. However, the question of how additional 
designations translate into additional donors is difficult to answer. First donor designation does not 
guarantee actual donation since only a very small fraction of decedents actually become eligible to be organ 
donors. Estimates of eligible decedents range between 10,500 and 13,800 [70] compared with over 2.4 
million deaths countrywide [122]. Second, even if a designated donor becomes an actual donor, organ 
donation generally happens many years after the individual joined the registry. Given the fuzzy relationship 
between designations and donors, it is difficult to determine if the number of designations generated is 
worth the money spent on promoting donor registries. Chapter 3 will investigate this connection between 
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designations and donors, and examine the cost-effectiveness of public education programs to promote donor 
registries. 
 
How much does CORE spend to get one additional designation? What does one 
additional designation mean in terms of organ donors? 
   ……Question 2 
  
44 
Table 3: Barriers to family authorization for organ donation 
Author Year Barriers to Family Authorization 
McNamara et al.  [113] 1997 
Perceived poor quality of care 
Poor explanation of brain death 
Suboptimal request for donation 
Guadagnoli et al.  [114] 1999 Race (Caucasians more likey to donate) 
Siminoff et al.  [116] 2001 
Family and patient demographics 
No prior knowledge of patient’s wishes 
Less time spent with the OPC 
Suboptimal request pattern experienced 
Rocheleau  [115] 2001 
Donor demographics 
Distrust of the medical community 
Religious beliefs 
Fear of mutilation 
Concern regarding use of organs 
Lack of knowledge about deceased’s wishes 
Misunderstanding of brain death 
Bereaved family’s emotional state 
Rodrigue et al.  [117] 2006 
Patient’s donation intentions known 
Older decedent 
Family’s organ donation beliefs 
Family approach not timely  
Perceived insensitivity of the OPC 
Rodrigue et al.  [118] 2008 Family disagreement regarding donation decision 
Brown et al.  [119] 2010 
Race 
Old age 
Death from a medical cause 
Untimely request  
Jacoby et al.  [120] 2010 
Lack of support from the OPC and hospital staff 
Percieved quality of care 
Organ donation not understood 
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1.8. IMPACT OF REGISTRY PROMOTION ON ORGAN SHORTAGE AND THE COST OF 
ORGAN SECURITY 
In this study we extend the analysis in study 2 to the level of the organ. The extent to which registry 
promotion can impact the organ shortage, and its financial impact on the society have not been previously 
quantified. These relationships warrant examination for several reasons. For one, the transplant waiting list 
is a composite list of individuals who are waiting for one or more organs and the demand for some organs 
is more than others. Second, donors do not yield all organs equally. Some organs such as kidney are more 
frequently recovered than other organs. The interaction between these two factors has important 
implications on the extent to which shortage of specific organs is addressed as well as the costs incurred.  
The objective of this study is to analyze the cost and potential impact of donor registry promotion 
in relation to organ shortage. Specifically, we examine two key issues: 1) what is the maximum potential 
effect on organ shortage that we can achieve through registry promotion (we refer to this as “impact 
threshold”); and 2) what are the costs associated with securing each type of solid organ and reaching the 
impact threshold?  Later these issues are analyzed in the context of arresting the growth of the transplant 
waiting list. At present, the prospects of supplying enough organs to clear the waiting list are gloomy. A 
more reasonable goal for the society would be to arrest the growth of the transplant waiting list. Our intent 
in this study is to initiate a discussion on whether donor registry promotion has the potential to address the 
organ shortage in a meaningful manner and if the associated costs are affordable. Later we discuss other 
conventional strategies as well as the recent innovations to expand the supply of cadaveric organs.  
What is the impact threshold of donor registry promotion and how much does it 
cost to arrest the growth in organ shortage?  
……Question 3 
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1.9. SUMMARY 
The remarkable progress of transplant medicine in the latter half of the twentieth century that led 
to an unprecedented demand for donated organs has caught the transplant community off-guard. In 
response, the organ donation community has evolved into a highly specialized organ procurement network 
driven by the legislative developments over the past 35 years. Primarily governed by the CMS Conditions 
of Participation and Conditions of Coverage, the organ procurement network strives to attain effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity through the well-defined roles and responsibilities of donor hospitals, transplant 
centers and the organ procurement organizations. Two core activities of the OPOs, clinical services and 
public education, serve as the conceptual framework for studies 1 and 2. Study 1 examines the interaction 
between the OPO and donor hospitals- the organ donation process. Study 2 examines the OPOs public 
education efforts and their effect on the actual donor pool. Study 3 extends the analysis in study 2 to the 
level of the organ. Figure 3 presents the broad organization of the organ procurement and transplantation 
network as well as the aspects that form the focus of this dissertation.  
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 Figure 3: The OPTN Schematic 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF PROCESS BREAKDOWNS ON CADAVERIC ORGAN 
SUPPLY IS MEDIATED BY DONATION RATE AND NOT BY ORGAN YIELD 
PER DONOR. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The success of organ transplants in treating end-stage organ failure has led to an unprecedented 
demand for transplantable organs that unfortunately remain in short supply. As a result, relatively few 
organs are transplanted compared to the number of people with end-stage disease. In 2012, more than 
116,000 patients were on the waiting list for an organ transplant but only about 28,000 transplants were 
performed [123]. Consequently 6,508 patients died while waiting for a life-saving organ [123]. Increasing 
the availability of transplantable organs is therefore critical to improvements in health related quality-of-
life and life-expectancy of people with end-stage organ failure. Thus, it is an urgent and an ongoing concern 
that opportunity for organ donation is preserved when caring for critically ill patients.  
Estimates of organ donation potential indicate that there is a sizeable potential donor pool that the 
organ donation community is yet to completely realize. In the U.S. (1997-1999), there were estimated 
40,610 brain-dead potential organ donors but only 17,127 actual donors [70]. Poor relationship between 
key organizations including organ procurement organizations (OPOs) and hospitals in their donation 
service area (DSA) is one of the several reasons for this tragic loss of donors [124]. In 2001, the Organ 
Donation Breakthrough Collaborative was established to, among other reasons, encourage collaboration 
between the OPOs and the donor and transplant hospitals [125]. By sharing experiences, collective 
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problem-solving exercises and celebrating success together, a community of OPOs and hospitals committed 
to quality improvement has emerged. Although considerable increase in the number of organs available for 
transplantation has been realized since the collaborative began [51-54, 81], acute shortage of organs 
continues to be a major challenge for the transplant community.  
In recent years critical pathways for organ donation have been developed to preserve the opportunity 
for donation. Critical pathways, also called “clinical pathways” or “care maps”, help standardize medical care, 
reduce variability and improve outcomes in high volume and high risk procedures [104]. In the context of 
organ donation, “high volume” means that the organ donation process must be initiated every time a patient 
nears death. “High risk” signifies the high likelihood of losing viable organs if the donation process is not 
optimally timed and sequenced. In the U.S., standardized protocols for organ donation have been jointly 
developed by the OPOs and their partnering hospitals. These protocols incorporate the best practices (Table 
4) that are being continually identified and disseminated through the Donation and Transplantation 
Community of Practice and the National Learning Congress. OPOs invest considerable resources in training 
hospital staff in following the best practices, about their roles in the organ donation process, and on how to 
eliminate errors in patient care that may jeopardize the potential for donation. Although there is a committed 
and a quality-oriented culture, competing priorities in the hospital and the inherent complexity of critical 
care can sometimes lead to deviations from the best practices. OPOs identify these deviations as process 
breakdowns and spend considerable resources in identifying and addressing them. Process breakdown is a 
generic term applied to a set of failures in the donation process that can jeopardize the opportunity for 
donation. While several studies have identified a relationship between process breakdowns and conversion 
rate (the actual number of organ donors divided by the number of eligible deaths) [112, 126-129], it is 
unclear how process breakdowns affect the supply of viable organs.  
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Table 4: Best practices in donation process 
 
• Prompt identification of imminent death patients. 
• Timely notification to the OPO (within 1 hr. of identifying imminent death 
patient). 
• Notifying the OPO about every death. 
• Early and aggressive potential donor management, and 
• Timely and designated family approach (optimal request for organ donation). 
 
2.2. METHODS 
A retrospective analysis of decedents was conducted using data from the Center for Organ 
Recovery and Education (CORE), an independent OPO that serves western Pennsylvania and most of West 
Virginia. All deaths from January 1st 2010 through December 31st 2012 were considered for the analysis. 
All data manipulation and analytic procedures were performed using MS Excel® 2010 (Microsoft 
Corporation) and Stata® SE 13.0 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas). 
2.2.1. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
We included only those decedents that died an ‘eligible death’ in our analysis. CMS defines eligible 
death as brain-dead individuals up to age 70 who do not exhibit any of the exclusionary conditions listed in 
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CMS Conditions for Coverage for OPOs (42 CFR §486.302). Eligible decedents who become organ donors 
are called standard criteria donors (SCD). Donors after cardiac death (DCD) and expanded criteria donors 
(ECD) were excluded from the analysis. CMS does not define eligible deaths for DCD or ECD cases.  Thus, 
while CORE tracks ECD and DCD cases, there is no objective definition or tracking possible for cases that 
might have proceeded to ECD or DCD but did not. Including DCD and ECD in the regression model may 
thus produce biased estimates of the effect of PBD on donation (See Appendix A-1). 
2.2.2. Data Collection 
We analyzed decedent records extracted from CORE’s data system that contains information on all 
deaths that occur within its DSA. Real-time patient information that includes patient’s demographics (age, 
race, and gender), eligibility for donation, designated donor status, final donor status, and whether there 
was a process breakdown is jointly entered into the system by the donor referral coordinator and the organ 
procurement coordinator. In addition, process breakdowns are often identified through retrospective 
medical record review and entered into the system by hospital development staff. Like hospitals, CORE 
uses a proprietary electronic medical record system to aid its procurement and referral coordinators in 
documenting patient-related information. Each variable was extracted as a separate Excel® spreadsheet and 
merged using referral ID that uniquely identifies each death.  
2.2.3. Variables 
For each decedent, information was retrieved for age, gender, race, hospital where death occurred, 
eligible death status, organ donor status, whether the decedent had joined the state donor registry, organs 
transplanted, and whether there was a process breakdown. In addition, we identified two hospitals that had 
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inhouse coordinator programs. Inhouse coordinators are assigned to a single hospital and perform the role 
of both organ procurement coordinators and professional services liaison.  This model is often used at larger 
hospitals with high donation potential. 
2.2.3.1.  Outcome Variables 
There are two outcome variables of interest in this analysis: 1) the likelihood of an eligible decedent 
becoming an organ donor. This variable can assume only two values- either “0” or “1"; and 2) the “number 
of organs transplanted per donor”. This variable assumes whole number values from “0” to “8” with “8” 
being the maximum number of organs that can be transplanted from one donor. 
2.2.3.2.  Predictor Variable 
The predictor variable is whether there was a process breakdown in the care of an eligible decedent. 
Table 5 presents a list of process breakdowns that CORE’s personnel identify, document and resolve on a 
day-to-day basis. For missed referrals, untimely referrals and suboptimal request for donation, CORE 
assesses whether or not referral and request requirements specified in CMS Conditions of Participation for 
Hospitals (42 CFR §482.45) were met. De-escalation of care and early extubtion are documented if either 
happens before a request for donation is made to the family.  
 
  
53 
Table 5: Process breakdowns and determination criteria 
Name Description Determination 
Missed  
Referral 
The OPO was never notified about the 
deceased.  
Unaccounted patient deaths are found during 
medical/death record review by the hospital 
development staff. 
Untimely Referral 
The OPO was not notified about the 
imminent death within 1 hour of such 
determination, or if the patient has died, 
within one hour of death. 
The donor referral coordinator who receives the 
call from the hospital verifies the time of 
imminent death determination, or if the patient 
has died, the time of patient’s death. These times 
are then compared with the time when the 
hospital notifies the OPO. 
Suboptimal 
Request for 
Donation 
Either the timing of the request is poor or 
the person requesting donation is not a 
trained requestor. Poor timing of the request 
include discussing donation either before or 
soon after the family is informed about 
patient’s death. 
These process breakdowns are either self-
reported by the hospital staff (for example, “Dr. 
Doug mentioned organ donation to the family”) 
or by the family to the procurement coordinator 
(“We have been asked about donation and we 
don’t want to do it”). 
De-escalation of 
Care 
The referral is made timey but 
hemodynamic stability is not maintained 
and life-saving measures are discontinued. 
Only comfort measures are provided. 
While assessing patient’s medical record, the 
procurement coordinator finds that the patient is 
on “comfort only” measure.   
Early Extubation 
Initial referral is made on time but the 
patient is withdrawn from the ventilator 
before the family is offered the opportunity 
to donate.  
Self-explanatory. The procurement coordinator 
records that the patient was removed from the 
ventilator and passed away before request for 
organ donation is made to the family.  
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2.2.4. Descriptive Analysis 
We first computed the total number of eligible deaths that occurred in CORE’s DSA. All analyses 
that followed were performed on eligible death subset of all deaths. We conducted univariate analysis on 
age, race, gender, organ donors, organs transplanted and process breakdowns.  
2.2.5. Bivariate Analysis 
For bivariate analyses, donors were compared with non-donors; and registered decedents were 
compared with non-registered decedents for age, race and gender. Significance of difference in age was 
tested using Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (test of medians). Chi-squared test was used to test the 
significance of difference in race (proportion of Caucasians) and gender (proportion of females). Bivariate 
analysis using Chi-squared test was also performed on the probability of becoming a donor in a hospital 
with an inhouse coordinator compared to one without an inhouse coordinator. The unadjusted effect of 
process breakdown on the probability of becoming a donor was examined using Chi-squared test and organs 
transplanted per donor using Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test.  
2.2.6. Regression Framework 
The process being modelled is a two-stage process. In the first stage, an eligible decedent becomes 
an organ donor after the decedent’s family authorizes donation. In cases where the family refuses donation, 
there is no possibility of recovering any organs from the decedent resulting in “structural zeroes” in the 
number of organs transplanted.  In the second stage, organs from a donor are offered for transplantation. 
Depending on several factors including viability of the organs offered, the potential recipient’s health etc., 
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organs are either rejected or accepted for transplant. When the organ is rejected, “sampling zeroes” arise. 
When organs are accepted, the number of organs transplanted assumes discrete positive values. In other 
words, the number of organs transplanted is primarily a count distribution with a mix of structural and 
sampling zeroes. 
Since our data had a large mass of zeroes, single stage regression was ruled out. Our first choice 
was a two-part hurdle model where, in the first part, we would model the likelihood that an eligible decedent 
becomes a donor using logistic regression. In the second part we would use Poisson or negative binomial 
regression to model the organs transplanted per donor. Two-part models are commonly used in modelling 
healthcare costs where majority of individuals, who do not utilize medical care in a given year, have zero 
healthcare costs. The zeroes observed in these data are purely structural and the two-part model evaluates 
the zero observations separate from non-zero observations. However, since the zeroes observed in our data 
are a mix of structural and sampling zeroes, a hurdle model would misclassify some of the donors who did 
not yield transplantable organs as non-donors. For our data, a zero-inflated model is more appropriate since 
it models only those zeroes separately that are in excess of what would be expected based on the remaining 
non-zero observations, that is, some sampling zeroes are expected. In essence, a zero-inflated model is a 
two-part model where the assumption that all zeroes are structural is relaxed. The other decision we made 
is to use Poisson regression in the zero-inflated model instead of negative binomial regression since in our 
data, the mean number of organs transplanted per donor is equal to its variance (data are not over-dispersed).  
2.2.6.1.  Model Selection 
The choice of covariates to be included in the model was informed by theory, results of the bivariate 
analysis and a priori assumption; and confirmed using model fit statistics. For modelling excessive zeroes, 
the variable age, which is a known determinant of the likelihood of becoming an organ donor, was included 
[117, 119]. Other covariates included were whether or not a decedent had joined the state donor registry, 
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and being a Caucasian since these covariates were significantly different between donors and non-donors 
in the bivariate analysis. For modelling the organs transplanted per donor only age was included as a 
covariate based on a priori belief that older decedents will yield less viable organs.  
Hospital-level differences were not controlled by inclusion as a covariate or using fixed-effects. 
There are two possible mechanisms through which hospital-level differences might affect organ donation 
rates. First, factors such as ownership, mission (profit vs. non-profit), level of trauma services, and having 
a transplant program are known to be associated with a wide range of indicators of organ procurement 
performance [130]. However these factors are unlikely to affect our estimates since their effect on donation 
rates is mediated through process breakdown. OPOs maintain inhouse coordinators in underperforming 
hospitals with large donation potential for the same reason, that is, to reduce process breakdowns so that 
donation rates can be improved. The other mechanism through which hospital-level differences might affect 
our analysis is if patients and their families are more likely to be similar to other patients and families in 
the same hospital. We treated this intra-hospital correlation as a nuisance and accounted for this clustering 
by computing clustered standard errors.  
2.2.6.2.  Model Fit and Sensitivity Analysis  
We computed several statistics of model fit including Cragg and Uhler’s Pseudo-R-squared, 
McFadden’s Adjusted R-squared, AIC, BIC and model Deviance to check the appropriateness of the model 
selection. To assess the overall goodness-of-fit, we examined the sensitivity of our estimates under the zero-
inflated Poisson model to alternative regression frameworks (zero-inflated negative binomial and two-part 
model). Although we did not examine individual organs transplanted separately due to a small sample size, 
we are certain that different organs are variably sensitive to process breakdowns. Using logistic regression 
and controlling for the same covariates as in the zero-inflated Poisson model, we computed the adjusted log 
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odds that a kidney, liver or heart is transplanted when there is a process breakdown. Lungs and pancreas 
transplants were excluded because these events are so rare to produce valid estimates.  
2.3. RESULTS 
2.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Out of the 84,817 deaths reported to CORE between January 1st, 2010 and December 31st, 2012, 
there were only 424 eligible deaths of which 324 (76.4%) went on to become organ donors. As a result, 
1,100 organs were transplanted in the three year period. The mean number of organs transplanted per 
eligible decedent was 2.6 with 115 out of 424 eligible decedents not yielding any transplantable organ (a 
mix of structural and sampling zeroes). Figure 1 presents the distribution of organs transplanted from 
eligible decedents. Among the 324 donors, 15 donors did not yield any transplantable organ (sampling 
zeroes). The mean number of organs transplanted per donor was 3.40 and the variance was 3.41 suggesting 
that Poisson regression (in the second part of the model) is appropriate. Figure 2 presents the distribution 
of organs transplanted from donors. 
2.3.2. Eligible Deaths 
There are 155 hospitals in CORE’s DSA but only 41 hospitals had one or more eligible deaths. 
Furthermore, eligible deaths were highly concentrated; 82% of eligible deaths were concentrated in 10 
hospitals and 58% in only 4 hospitals. CORE uses in-house coordinators program in the two hospitals with 
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the largest donation potential; these hospitals account for 35% of all eligible deaths in the DSA. Descriptive 
statistics on eligible deaths are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6: Descriptive statistics on eligible deaths 
Median age 37 years 
Females 40% 
Registered donors 32% 
Race 
Caucasians 87% 
 African-Americans 11% 
Process Breakdowns (N) 25 
Suboptimal request 17 
Untimely referral 5 
De-escalation of care / Early extubation) 1 
Unidentified 2 
2.3.3. Bivariate Analysis 
Comparison of donors with non-donors and registered decedents with non-registered decedents is 
presented in Tables 7 and 8.  
Table 7: Difference between donors and non-donors 
Donors Non-donors P value 
Median Age 35 years 47 years 0.0001 
Females (%) 42% 33% 0.1242 
Caucasians 89% 78% 0.0042 
1 Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (test of medians) 
2 Chi-squared test 
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Table 8: Difference between registered and non-registered donors 
 Registered Donors 
Non-registered 
Donors P value 
Median Age 39 years 35 years 0.0581 
Females 47% 37% 0.0402 
Caucasians 95% 83% 0.0012 
1 Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (test of medians)  
2 Chi-squared test 
 
2.3.3.1.  Inhouse Coordinator and Organ Donors 
There was no difference in the likelihood of becoming an organ donor regardless of whether or not 
there was an inhouse coordinator in the hospital where the patient died. Seventy five percent of eligible 
decedents in hospitals with an inhouse coordinator became organ donors whereas this proportion was 77 
percent in hospitals without an inhouse coordinator (Unadjusted OR: 0.89; 95% CI: 0.557, 1.414; p>0.05). 
2.3.3.2.  Process Breakdowns and Organ Donors 
Overall, 76 percent of eligible decedents became organ donors. This proportion was slightly higher 
(79 percent) when there was no process breakdown but dropped to 36 percent when a process breakdown 
had occurred. There were 25 eligible decedents who had experienced a process breakdown in their care. Of 
these, only 9 decedents went on to become organ donors. Chi-squared test of conversion rate by process 
breakdown indicates a significant association between the two. An eligible decedent was 6.7 times more 
likely to become an organ donor if there was no process breakdown in the care of the patient (Unadjusted 
OR: 6.67; 95% CI: 2.85, 15.62; p<0.001).  
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2.3.3.3.  Process Breakdowns and Organs Transplanted (from eligible decedents) 
Overall, a mean of 2.59 organs were transplanted from an eligible decedent (includes eligible 
decedents who did not become organ donors), 52 percent of whom yielded at least 3 transplantable organs. 
In the presence of a process breakdown, the mean number of organs transplanted from an eligible decedent 
dropped to 1.16 with only a quarter of eligible decedents yielding 3 transplantable organs. When there was 
no process breakdown, 2.68 organs were transplanted per eligible decedent on average. Bivariate analysis 
using Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test indicates that an eligible decedent is expected to yield 
significantly greater number of organs when there is no process breakdown (p<0.001).  
2.3.4. Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression 
Holding other variables constant, the likelihood that an eligible decedent will become an organ 
donor is four times higher when there is no process breakdown (Adjusted OR: 4.01; 95% CI: 1.6838, 
9.6414; p<0.01). However once a decedent becomes a donor, whether there was a process breakdown does 
not affect the number of transplantable organs yielded by the donor. Regression results are presented in 
Table 9.  
In spite of effect-loss at the second stage in the organ donation process, process breakdowns exert 
strong detrimental effect on organs transplanted. For every process breakdown an eligible decedent yields 
around one less organ (dy/dx: -1.05; 95% CI: -2.0307, -0.0706; p<0.05). Age has a small but a strong effect 
on organs transplanted per eligible decedent. Joining the registry had a significant positive impact on the 
odds of becoming a donor. Decedent’s race was not significant. and the marginal effects are presented in 
Table 10. 
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Table 9: Results from Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression 
The likelihood of becoming an organ donor 
 Log Odds Clustered Std. Err. P-value 95% C.I. 
Process Breakdown -1.39 0.4452 0.002 -2.2663, -0.5211 
Age -0.04 0.0101 0.000 -0.0597, 0.0202 
Joined the Registry 3.94 1.7474 0.024 -0.5172, 7.3667 
Caucasian 0.51 0.357 0.129 -0.1489, 1.1732 
Organs transplanted per donor 
 Log Counts Clustered  Std. Err. P-value 95% C.I. 
Process Breakdown -0.16 0.1742 0.355 0.5027, 0.1802 
Age -0.01 0.0027 0.000 -0.1832, -0.0076 
N =424 
 
 
Table 10: Incremental and Marginal Effects 
 ExpOrgTx1 Std. Err. P-value 95% C.I. 
Process Breakdown -1.05 0.5000 0.036 -2.0307, -0.0706 
Age -0.05 0.0085 0.000 -0.0684, -0.0351 
Joined the Registry 1.79 0.7243 0.014 0.3675, 3.2067 
Caucasian 0.23 0.1511 0.124 -0.0640, 0.5283 
N = 424,  
1 Expected number of organs transplanted from each eligible decedent 
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2.3.4.1.  Model Fit and Sensitivity Analyses 
Fit statistics on various nested models are presented in Table 11. Fit statistics for the final model 
are either most favorable or very close. Results from sensitivity analyses using different regression 
frameworks are presented in Table 12. The coefficient estimates are almost identical for the predictor 
variable and other covariates (except joining the registry) under the zero-inflated Poisson, zero-inflated 
negative binomial and two-part model.  
 
Table 11: Statistics for Model Fit 
Excluded Variable(s) Cragg & Uhler’s Pseudo R2 
McFadden’s 
Adj. R2 AIC BIC Deviance 
None  
(Saturated Model) 0.269 0.065 3.708 -948.87 1548.69 
Age 0.156 0.032 3.840 -901.52 1608.15 
Joined Registry 0.171 0.036 3.826 -903.06 1600.55 
Female 0.271 0.067 3.698 -960.49 1550.15 
Caucasian 0.266 0.065 3.709 -952.88 1550.74 
IHC 0.269 0.067 3.704 -954.85 1548.76 
** Female & IHC 0.270 0.068 3.694 -966.37 1550.32 
Female, White & 
IHC1 0.270 0.068 3.694 -970.38 1552.36 
*   Underlined values represent most favorable model for each fit statistic. 
** These variables were excluded from the final model.  
1 IHC is Inhouse Coordinator 
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Table 12: Sensitivity analysis- regression framework 
  ZIP ZINB TPM 
Likelihood of becoming a Donor     
  Log Odds P-value 
Log 
Odds P-value 
Log 
Odds P-value 
 PBD -1.39 0.002 -1.39 0.002 -1.38 0.002 
 Age -0.04 0.000 -0.04 0.000 -0.04 0.000 
 Joined Registry 3.94 0.024 3.94 0.024 2.40 0.000 
 Caucasian 0.51 0.129 0.51 0.129 0.51 0.151 
Organs Transplanted per Donor     
  Log Count P-value 
Log 
Count P-value 
Log 
Count P-value 
 PBD -0.16 0.355 -0.16 0.355 -0.14 0.337 
 Age -0.11 0.000 -0.11 0.000 -0.01 0.000 
ZIP- Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression 
ZINB- Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression 
TPM- Two-Part Model 
 
 
Table 13 presents the log odds that a kidney, liver or heart is transplanted when there is a process 
breakdown. Liver is more sensitive to process breakdown than kidney and heart is more sensitive to process 
breakdown than liver. Kidney is most sensitive to increasing age while liver and heart are only slightly 
sensitive. All three organs are similarly sensitive to joining the registry. Being a Caucasian does not have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of kidney, liver or heart being transplanted.  
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Table 13: Sensitivity Analysis- Effect on Liver and Heart 
Kidney Liver Heart 
Log Odds P-value Log Odds P-value Log Odds P-value 
PBD -1.07 0.006 -1.67 0.000 -2.04 0.004 
Age -0.33 0.005 -0.04 0.000 -0.06 0.000 
Joined Registry 0.99 0.000 0.93 0.000 0.91 0.000 
Caucasian 0.79 0.001 0.12 0.648 0.07 0.748 
Coefficients from logistic regression were computed to compare the sensitivity of kidneys, liver 
and heart to process breakdown. For kidneys, the dependent variable is at least one kidney. 
2.4. DISCUSSION 
Evidence from published evaluations of quality improvement initiatives undertaken by several 
OPOs suggests that there is an inverse association between process breakdowns and donation rate [112, 
126-129]. Burris and Jacobs (1996) found that a mandatory twenty-minute training for staff in nursing, 
patient and family services, and pastoral care; and employing compliance monitoring tools resulted in an 
increase in the referral rate from 54 percent to 98 percent over a 10 month period. During the same time, 
donation rate for all decedents between 6 months old and 76 years old increased from 1.6 percent to 3.1 
percent [126].  
Sade et al. (2002) examined the effect of specialization  within the procurement process on the 
consent rates in an OPO’s DSA [127]. Between 1997 and 2001, after clinical services liaisons were recruited 
to educate the hospital staff about the donation process and review medical records for appropriateness of 
referrals, the number of referrals for all deaths increased by 49 percent. In addition, specialist family support 
counselors approached the family with the request for donation resulting in 90 percent increase in the 
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consent rate. During the same period, the donation rate per million population also increased by 83 percent 
[127].  
Similar association between timely referrals and organ donation rates was suggested by Koh et al. 
(2007) in their assessment of the Massachusetts Organ Donation Initiative [112]. The program was a data-
driven quality improvement program that involved coordination between the Massachusetts Department of 
Health, the regional OPO and the transplant centers [112]. They found that delayed referral and suboptimal 
request for donation accounted for most lost donation opportunities. The hospital liaisons implemented 
changes that increased referral rates from 83 percent to 94 percent. As a result the authorization rate 
increased from 60 percent to 67 percent, and conversion rate increased from 44 percent to 60 percent [112]. 
Franklin et al. (2009) found that systematic protocol driven changes to the organ donation process 
gradually improved organ donation rates across the OPOs DSA [128]. Changes relevant to best practices 
in organ donation included decoupling of the request process, family approached by clinical coordinator, 
and family support liaisons. Between 1993 and 2008, the conversion rate increased from 42 percent to 72 
percent [128].  
In one study however, researchers did not find an association between timely referral/appropriate 
family approach, and the conversion rate. Although implementing evidence-based best practices resulted 
in significant improvement in conversion rate (from 50 percent in 2004 to 80 percent in 2005), the referral 
rate, timely notification rate and the appropriate requester rate did not show significant improvement [129]. 
However, since that study only included 32 eligible decedents in the pre-implementation group and 30 
eligible decedents in the post-implementation group, it probably lacked sufficient power to detect the small 
improvements.   
Our study differs from the existing literature in two important ways. First, the existing literature is 
based on before-after comparison of donation rates at the level of the hospital or the DSA. We reexamined 
the relationship between process breakdowns and donation rates by using DSA-wide decedent level data to 
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adjust for other patient factors known to affect organ donation rates. Second, we also examined the effect 
of process breakdowns on organs transplanted per eligible decedent, which has not been previously studied. 
Our analysis indicates that process breakdowns significantly reduce the likelihood of organ 
donation but have no effect on the number of organs transplanted. The loss of effect in the second stage is 
best explained by how different process breakdowns are distributed. While 25 eligible decedents had 
experienced a process breakdown, only 9 of those decedents went on to become organ donors. Eight of 
these nine organ donors had experienced either a delayed referral or a suboptimal request for donation. 
Since delayed referrals and suboptimal requests, in theory, do not affect organ health or function, their 
insignificance in the second stage of the regression model was somewhat expected. Nevertheless we wanted 
to investigate this relationship to determine if there were other mediating factors through which these 
process breakdowns could exert their influence. First, delayed referral of an imminent death can delay 
identification of a potential donor, brain death testing and donor management, all of which will adversely 
affect organ function. Second, suboptimal request for donation may either result in family’s refusal to 
donate or more time spent on obtaining authorization resulting in a delay in organ retrieval. Even in 
optimally managed brain-dead donors, delay in retrieving organs can compromise organ quality. Although 
process breakdowns do not affect the number of organs transplanted once the family has authorized 
donation, the overall effect of process breakdowns is still significant owing to their strong effect on the 
likelihood of becoming a donor.  
Age at death exerted significant influence on the likelihood of becoming a donor as well as organs 
transplanted per donor. Our results indicate that older decedents are less likely to become donors than 
younger decedents. Since all decedents in our dataset were, by definition, eligible to become donors, the 
effect of age on becoming a donor is probably mediated through family authorization. Families of younger 
patients tend to authorize donation more often than families of older patients [117, 119]. This effect can be 
explained in part by a higher proportion of traumatic accidental deaths in the younger patients compared to 
older patients who die more often from a medical cause. In CORE’s DSA between 2010 through 2012, the 
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median age of donors who died from traumatic head injury was 28 years. In contrast, the median age of 
donors who died from a cerebrovascular accident or stroke was 59 years. Families of decedents who are 
brain dead from a medical cause (like stroke) have greater difficulty in understanding the concept of brain 
death and are more resistant to donation [119]. In addition, older decedents are likely in poorer health, also 
potentially leading to fewer organs transplanted per donor. 
Our results indicate that race and gender do not predict the likelihood of organ donation. Previous 
evidence suggests that women are more willing to donate their organs and discuss their willingness to 
donate with their families [131]. Since, having knowledge of the deceased’s wishes facilitates authorization 
for donation [115-117], we had expected female eligible decedents to have higher adjusted odds of organ 
donation. Contrary to previous studies [114, 119, 132], we did not find race to be a significant predictor 
either. While donors and non-donors in our data differed significantly by race (Caucasian), these differences 
disappeared when designated donor status was included in the regression model. Since Caucasians are more 
likely to have joined the state registry, the effect of being a Caucasian is mediated through the donor 
designation status, a significant covariate in the regression model (p=0.052).   
Contrary to existing literature [110, 133-136], our analysis does not indicate any significant 
association between an inhouse coordinator (IHC) program and the likelihood of organ donation. This 
disagreement can be explained by the difference in the design of the previous studies and our study. While 
previous studies compared the conversion rate before and after the implementation of the IHC program, in 
CORE’s DSA the IHC program predates our dataset and therefore ruled-out similar comparison. Our dataset 
only permitted comparison of donation rate between hospitals with and without IHC and there also, we did 
not find any differences. It is likely that the benefits from having an in-house coordinator have already been 
achieved in our DSA. IHC programs are typically implemented in large hospitals with high donation 
potential. The complexity of services these institutions provide puts undue burden on hospital resources 
resulting in competing priorities that negatively affect the donation process and lead to process breakdowns 
[134]. Having an inhouse coordinator improves adherence to best practices in the donation process [137] 
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and offsets the increased risk of process breakdowns in the larger hospitals. It stands to reason that OPOs 
would allocate resources to hospitals that are under-performing large donation potential. Accordingly, post-
IHC process breakdown and donation rates in larger hospitals tend to match (and not exceed) the DSA-
wide rates. 
Model fit statistics suggest that our choice of covariates in the model is reasonable. In addition, 
sensitivity analyses with alternative regression frameworks suggest that our model is robust to alternative 
assumptions and therefore has a reasonably good fit. We did not use split-sample cross-validation to assess 
overall goodness-of-fit owing to a small sample size and rarity of process breakdowns. The effect of process 
breakdown on the likelihood that an organ is transplanted was separately modelled for kidney, liver and 
heart to informally asses the relative sensitivity of each type of organ. Results indicate that kidneys are least 
sensitive to process breakdowns followed by liver and then heart. The implication of this finding is that 
process breakdowns will differentially impact the viability of kidney, liver and heart with heart more likely 
to be lost due to the detrimental effect of process breakdown than liver or kidney.  
The principal finding of this study is that process breakdowns have a strong adverse effect on the 
likelihood of organ donation but do not affect the organ yield once an eligible decedent becomes an organ 
donor. Nevertheless, process breakdowns exert a strong overall effect on organ availability. Our results 
suggest that for every process breakdown occurring in an eligible decedent, one less organ is available for 
transplant. Accordingly, we estimate that 25 organs were lost to process breakdowns over a three-year 
period. However it is worth noting that even if process breakdowns are completely eliminated, some organ 
donors will still be lost owing to other factors that make families averse to donation.  These factors which 
are largely outside the control of the OPOs and the hospitals include patient and family demographics [115, 
116], family’s religious beliefs [115], fear of mutilation and high value placed on bodily integrity [115, 
138], concern about use of organs and distrust of medical community [115], family not knowing decedent’s 
wishes [115-117], poor understanding of brain death [113, 115], bereaved family’s emotional state [115], 
and family disagreement regarding donation decision [118]. Understanding of brain death is especially 
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important because higher authorization rates cannot be achieved unless the relatives of the decedent 
understand that there is no hope of recovery [139]. However when decedents have their name on the 
registry, family’s decision about donation became irrelevant owing to the legal guarantee afforded under 
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987.  It is therefore not surprising that 100% of eligible decedents 
who had joined the state donor registry became donors.  
2.4.1    Limitations 
This study was based on data from one OPO that serves western Pennsylvania and West Virginia. 
The results of our study may have limited generalizability outside this geographic region. In spite of efforts at 
dissemination and adoption of emerging state-of-the-art practices, there are wide variations in organ donor 
practices across different DSAs, including the way process breakdowns are defined and recorded.  
In CORE’s DSA, process breakdowns are documented and recorded by the procurement coordinators 
themselves. This poses two potential issues. First, there is a potential for measurement error if different staff 
interprets the categories differently or fail to record situations in order to protect themselves or to avoid conflict 
with the hospital staff. However, we believe that the likelihood of wide variation in classification of process 
breakdowns is low, due to the close teamwork among the PSL staff, use of a standardized electronic data 
system, and the fact that the data are auditable by CMS. The second issue is the potential risk of recall bias if 
the procurement coordinator’s documentation of a process breakdown is correlated with whether or not an 
eligible death becomes a donor. To assess if this bias was affecting our analysis, we compared the eligible 
decedents with the non-eligible decedents for the fraction of process breakdowns. Three percent of all non-
eligible deaths had a documented process breakdown while this fraction was slightly higher (4.1%) for eligible 
deaths (p>0.05) suggesting that there is a great degree of independence between documenting the process 
breakdown and the outcome of a particular case. 
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CHAPTER 3:  PROMOTING DONOR REGISTRIES THROUGH PUBLIC EDUCATION- WHAT 
IS THE COST OF SECURING ORGAN DONORS? 
3.1. BACKGROUND 
United States faces an acute shortage of transplantable organs. The situation will worsen in the 
future as each year the number of people who become eligible for a transplant outpaces the number of organ 
donors. Organ donor registries, databases of individuals who have expressed an intention to donate their 
organs on death, are widely regarded as a remedy to this problem. Donor registries draw their authority 
from the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act [140]. According to this law, the document of anatomical gift is 
irrevocable other than by the individual himself. In addition, organ procurement organizations (OPOs) are 
legally obligated to honor the preferences of individuals who had joined the registry prior to death [140]. 
In such cases, the OPO does not need authorization for donation from the family. State donor registries are 
therefore crucial in reducing the shortage of organs. Individuals can join the donor registry by designating 
themselves on the driver’s license or the state ID, registering online, or by signing a donor card. The most 
common method of joining the donor registry is at the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). While the 
driver’s license/state ID may display an individual’s designation status, the actual registration is stored 
online in a secure database. Each state maintains its own registry that can only be accessed by the OPO(s) 
that covers that state, and only for imminent death patients or decedents who have been referred to the OPO. 
Donor registries are a joint effort. While the registries are generally maintained by the states, 
typically by the DMV, OPOs invest considerable resources in promoting the registry in their designated 
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service areas (DSAs). The premise behind these investments is that more registrations will result in 
additional donors. However, it is difficult to precisely quantify by how much would additional registrations 
increase the supply of donors. First, the likelihood that a registered individual will die in a manner that 
makes him or her eligible for donation is very low. Estimates of eligible decedents range between 10,500 
and 13,800 [70] compared with over 2.4 million deaths countrywide [122]. Second, for any individual who 
registers today, the donation event is expected to occur in distant future. Thus, the benefit of registering an 
individual must take into account the time before the actual payoff. It is therefore difficult to determine if 
the number of donor designations generated is worth the resources expended on promoting the donor 
registry.   
To date, there are no studies that have examined the costs of promoting the registry and its effect 
on the supply of donors. The objective of this paper is to examine precisely that. Specifically, we attempt 
to answer three questions from the perspective of an OPO. First, what is the cost of promoting the donor 
registry? Second, how many individuals join the registry as a result of donor registry promotion and what 
is the “cost per registrant”? Third, what is the value of these registrants in terms of present-day organ donors 
and what is the “cost per donor”?  
Previously, Mendeloff et al. have estimated the societal value of one donor by calculating the 
average number of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) derived [141]. They estimated that one donor 
generates 13 QALYs of health benefit for the society. Assuming that the society is willing to spend up to 
$100,000 per QALY and based on estimated QALYs per donor, Mendeloff et al. concluded that the value 
of one donor would be $1,086,000 (after subtracting the costs associated with organ transplant) [141]. In 
2006, using Mendeloff et al.’s estimate of $1,086,000 per donor, Howard & Byrne estimated that the value 
of one 18-year old registrant to the society is either $1900 under a first-person consent system or $840 if 
the family has the right to refuse donation [142]. Their estimate was based on an 18-years old individual’s 
lifetime probability of becoming a donor. This probability was calculated based on the number of person-
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years in that age group, age group-specific number of actual and potential donors, and age group-specific 
death rate. 
Our study is in some ways similar to the works of Mendeloff et al. and Howard & Byrne except for 
certain differences. First, unlike Mendeloff et al. and Howard & Byrne who estimate donors’ and 
registrants’ monetary value to the society respectively, we estimate the actual “cost per registrant” and “cost 
per donor”. Second, we employ a rather classical approach to this analysis. We first estimate the cost of 
promoting the donor registry and the number of registrations generated from promotion activities to 
estimate the cost per registrant. Next, we use Markov analysis to estimate the value of the registrants in 
terms of present-day organ donors to estimate the cost per donor.  
3.2. METHODS 
In this study we have primarily relied on data from the Center for Organ Recovery and Education 
(CORE). One of the 58 federally designated OPOs; CORE serves western Pennsylvania and most of West 
Virginia. We examined the costs and outcomes associated with CORE’s registry promotion efforts from 
2010 through 2012. While costs estimates were directly obtained from CORE’s outreach budget, the 
number of registrants and donors that result from CORE’s promotion efforts was estimated using decision 
analysis modelling. The probabilistic relationship between registrants and donors was modelled using 
Markov analysis. We do not have a comparison strategy in this analysis. Accordingly, we use published 
estimates of the monetary value of a registrant and a donor as benchmarks for comparison [141, 142]. 
The costs in our analysis are determined and fixed. For estimating registrants and donors, we first 
perform a base case analysis using central estimates of the model parameters. Furthermore for estimating 
donors, we develop two scenarios based on the manner in which authorization (more commonly referred to 
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as consent) for donation is given. These scenarios are discussed under assessment of donors. We also 
perform sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of our estimates of registrants and donors generated from 
CORE’s registry promotion effort.  
3.2.1. Base Case Analysis 
3.2.1.1. Assessment of Costs of CORE’s Donor Registry Promotion 
We assume that the cost of operating the online database is zero since most state donor registries 
are appended to existing DMV information technology systems. We have therefore considered only the 
costs associated with CORE’s outreach activities. Each year, CORE outlays a specific amount to invest in 
public education and promoting the donor registry. We obtained CORE’s expenditure on community 
outreach from 2010 through 2012 [143] and aggregated it to calculate a three-year cost of promoting the 
donor registry. These expenditures include all monies that are spent on community outreach efforts 
including personnel wages, professional education expenses, travel expenses, cost of promotional materials, 
cost of media campaigns and departmental overheads. Although the costs are incurred over a three-year 
period, we consider these as one-time upfront costs since for any individual who joins the registry there are 
no recurring costs. For illustration, the planned and actual expenditure on community outreach in the year 
2012 are detailed in Appendix E. Expenditure on community outreach in years 2010 and 2011 were 
provided to us by CORE in identical format.  
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3.2.1.2. Assessment of Registrations from CORE’s Donor Registry Promotion 
CORE, like all OPOs, uses a two-pronged approach for promoting the donor registry. On one hand, 
CORE uses broadcast media including radio, television, and billboards, as well as social media websites 
like Facebook® to educate the public about the importance of joining the donor registry (media approach); 
on the other, CORE reaches out to the community through in-person campaigns at a range of venues 
including faith-based events, youth festivals, sporting events, health fairs, and driver’s license bureaus (in-
person approach). The goal of the media approach is to expose large swaths of population to pro-donation 
messages while the in-person campaigns target smaller sections of the population but with greater intensity. 
For the number of new donor registrations from CORE’s promotion effort over the three year period 
(2010-2012), we used separate sources of data for registrations resulting from in-person outreach and those 
attributed to media campaigns. Registrations from in-person outreach were obtained directly from CORE. 
CORE regularly reaches out to the public at various community events. At these events CORE encourages 
individuals to join the registry by signing a donor card. CORE uses the donor card information to register 
people in Pennsylvania and West Virginia state donor registries via the internet and stores the donor card 
for future reference. CORE provided us a de-identified list of all individuals who joined the registry at all 
outreach events between 2010 and 2012 [144]. The list contained only registrants’ date of birth and date of 
joining the registry. The total number of individuals on the list represents the total registrations generated 
through in-person outreach. At some of the outreach events, CORE’s employees and volunteers use mobile 
devices to sign-up individuals directly into the state donor registry [145]. These online registrations are 
captured in a separate report provided by CORE [146]. Donor card registrations and online registrations at 
outreach events were added to obtain the total in-person registrations.  
For registrations from media campaigns, we used quarterly reports that CORE receives from the 
Department of Motor Vehicles in Pennsylvania and West Virginia [147, 148]. These reports show, for each 
county and each quarter, total registrations regardless of whether the individual enrolled at the DMV or 
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online, and includes individuals that CORE enrolled through in-person outreach. Change in total number 
of registrations from December 31st, 2009 to December 31st, 2012 was calculated for each county that falls 
in CORE’s DSA and aggregated. To calculate the registrations resulting from media campaigns, we 
assumed that a fraction of all registrations can be attributed to media campaigns (i.e., in the absence of such 
campaigns, the number of donor designations would be lower). In their meta-analytic review, Feeley & 
Moon have estimated that communities that are exposed to media campaigns promoting organ donation 
have 5% more registrations (r=0.05; 95% CI: 0.03, 0.07; p<0.001) [149]. That is, 5 out of 105 new 
registrations or 4.762% of new registrations result from exposure to media campaigns. For accuracy, we 
excluded the in-person registrants from the total DMV registrations prior to calculating registrants from 
media campaigns. Based on a summary of media purchasing by CORE [150], we assume that the entire 
population in CORE’s DSA was exposed to pro-donation messages multiple times.  
Registrations from in-person outreach and those from media campaigns were added to obtain the 
total number of registrants that resulted from CORE’s promotion of the organ donor registry. 
3.2.1.3. Assessment of Donors 
For donors, we began with the above cohort of new registrants and simulated their death as a 
function of their age at the time of joining the registry. We used Markov analysis to calculate the expected 
value of this cohort in terms of present-day donors. The analysis was conducted using TreeAge® Pro 2014 
(TreeAge Software, Inc., Williamstown, MA). In addition, estimates of some model parameters (discussed 
later) were obtained from the analysis of CORE’s decedent records using Stata 13.0 (StataCorp, College 
Station, TX). 
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Markov Model 
The Markov state diagram in Figure 4 presents the various states a registrant can enter. A registrant 
enters the Markov model at the time of joining the donor registry. From here each year, the registrant has a 
small risk of death that increases with the registrant’s age in subsequent Markov cycles. One Markov cycle 
represents one year of life. The analysis was set to run until the entire cohort of registrants was absorbed 
into the two dead states (became or did not become an organ donor). In each cycle there is a small risk that 
the registrant will leave the donor registry and exit the model with zero payoff. The payoff is positive when 
a registrant becomes a donor and can only be realized when a registrant dies, i.e., there are no incremental 
pay-offs in this model but only a final payoff at the time of death. 
Figure 4: Markov state diagram for an individual who joined the donor registry 
The Markov-cycle tree is presented in Figure 5. Upon death, the expected value of a registrant in 
terms of an organ donor depends on two factors: 1) the time-variant probability that the registrant dies in a 
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manner that renders him/her eligible to donate; and 2) the marginal probability that authorization for 
donation will be obtained for the eligible deceased registrant. The marginal probability accounts for the fact 
that eligible decedents who had not joined the registry (and who do not enter our model) can also become 
donors. Therefore the benefit of joining the registry is the difference in the probability of a registrant 
becoming a donor and the probability of a non-registrant becoming a donor. 
The expected donor value of all registrants will accumulate until the entire cohort has been 
absorbed. Since registrants are expected to live certain number of years before they die, their expected 
donor value is at a point in future. Their present-day value is calculated by discounting the future value at 
a given social discount rate. We assume that 100% of eligible decedents are identified and referred to the 
OPO in a timely manner.  
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Separate Markov models were run for registrants from the media campaigns and those from in-person 
outreach because of differences in the age distribution of the two groups. 
The probabilities of entering the various Markov states are discussed under “Model Parameters” and 
presented in Table 7. 
Figure 5: Markov-cycle tree 
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Scenarios for Estimating Donors 
By joining the registry individuals are guaranteed to become organ donors if they are deemed 
eligible to donate at the time of their death. This guarantee emanates from the Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act of 1987 that mandates that donor cards and other expressions of intent to donate one’s organs be 
recognized as a legally binding document [41]. In spirit of this law, if someone is eligible to donate and if 
he or she had her name in the registry then organ recovery can proceed without further authorization from 
the family. Under this first-person authorization model, the probability that a registered decedent who is 
eligible to donate will become an organ donor equals 1.0.  
In reality however, OPOs generally abstain from such practice due to risk of negative publicity. 
Instead they use the donor registries as means to convey decedent’s wishes to the family and convince them 
that donating their loved one’s organs is what the decedent had desired. This is the family authorization 
model. Evidence suggests that family’s knowledge about the decedent’s wishes is an important determinant 
of the family’s decision to donate [115-117] and therefore the probability of family authorizing donation is 
conditional on their knowledge about the decedent’s designated donor status. This is corroborated by 
Siminoff & Lawrence who have found that 89.19% of families will authorize donation when they know 
that their relative had joined the donor registry compared to 47.55% when the family knows that the relative 
had not joined the registry [151].  
We examined the donor value of registrants under the above two scenarios. 
Model Parameters 
Table 14 presents the model parameters used in the analysis. Feeley and Moon provide estimates 
of the effect of media campaigns [149]. The probability of family authorizing donation for an eligible 
deceased registrant is obtained from Siminoff and Lawrence [151]. For the probability of family authorizing 
80 
donation for non-registrants, we analyzed decedent records extracted from CORE’s data system that 
contains information on all deaths that occur within its DSA. Real-time patient information that includes 
patient’s demographics, eligibility for donation, decedent’s registered donor status and final donor status is 
jointly entered into the system by the donor referral coordinator and the organ procurement coordinator 
[152]. Out of 424 brain-dead eligible decedents between 2010 and 2012, 136 decedents had their name on 
the donor registry and 100% of these decedents became organ donors. This is the probability of a registered 
eligible decedent becoming a donor under the first-person authorization model. Out of the remaining 288 
non-registered eligible decedents where CORE had to request authorization from the family, only 65.28% 
became donors. This is the central estimate of family authorizing donation when they know that the patient 
had not joined the registry. Computation of marginal probability of an eligible deceased registrant becoming 
a donor under the first-person authorization and family authorization model is described in the footnotes of 
Table 7. The age-specific probability of death was obtained from the most recent U.S. Life Tables [153]. 
We assumed that there is a very small probability that an individual will leave the registry. This value was 
arbitrarily chosen since current literature does not inform our understanding of this phenomenon yet we are 
certain that this occurs, however infrequently.  
We constructed tables of predicted probability distribution for two variables: registrants’ age; and 
the age-dependent probability of dying an eligible death. The predicted probability that a registrant was of 
a particular age was computed using negative binomial regression. The dependent variable was the number 
of registrants and the predictor variable was age. This analysis was restricted to 18 years and older since 
only individuals of legal adult age can join the registry and become organ donors without parental consent. 
The post-regression predicted number of registrants by age was divided by the total number of 18 years and 
older registrants to obtain the predicted probability of a registrant being of particular age. For in-person 
outreach, we used CORE’s de-identified list of all registrations that contained the registrant’s date of birth 
and the date of joining the registry [144]. For media campaigns in West Virginia, we used West Virginia 
DMV Transaction Data for 2009-2011 [154]. These data were requested from the West Virginia DMV for 
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a previous study by one of the co-authors and contain every driver’s license or state ID issuance and renewal 
transaction that took place in West Virginia between 2009 and 2011 (total 1.12 million transactions). For 
each transaction, the dataset contains among other variables, customer’s date of birth, date of the transaction 
and whether or not the customer joined the organ donor registry. For registrants from media campaigns in 
Pennsylvania, we assumed that West Virginians do not significantly differ from Pennsylvanians in their 
age distribution. Indeed, according to the Demographic and Housing Estimates for 2013 [155], the 
distribution of the two populations by age-group is strikingly similar. A graphical comparison of the 
population distribution by age in the two states is provided in Appendix F.  
Age-dependent predicted probability that a decedent died an eligible death was computed using 
logistic regression. The dependent variable was whether a decedent died an eligible death and the 
independent variable was the age of the decedent. The dataset used was CORE’s decedent records [152]. 
The predicted probability distributions of registrant’s age and age-dependent probability of dying an eligible 
death are graphically presented in Appendix G. 
3.2.2. Sensitivity Analyses 
Monte Carlo probabilistic sensitivity analyses were performed using TreeAge® Pro 2014 (TreeAge 
Software, Inc., Williamstown, MA). Since we use CORE’s actual expenditure of promoting the donor 
registry, the upfront costs in this analysis are ‘certain’ and therefore cannot be subject to sensitivity analyses. 
We use sensitivity analysis to determine the expected range of registrants and donors that result from 
CORE’s promotional activities. 
For the expected range of registrants resulting from CORE’s promotion activities, registrations 
resulting from in-person outreach, like costs, are fixed and therefore are not amiable to sensitivity analysis. 
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For registrations resulting from media campaigns, we used Feeley and Moon’s 95% confidence bounds of 
the effect of media campaigns [149].  
For the expected range of donors, we performed Monte Carlo probabilistic sensitivity analyses on 
the probabilities of family authorization and first-person authorization, Markov transition probabilities, the 
effect of media campaigns and the social discount rate. For all sensitivity analyses, the plausible range of 
values that each model parameter can assume is presented in Table 7. Unless otherwise specified, the 
plausible range of values depicts the 95% confidence intervals that we computed around the central 
estimates. For the probability that a registrant might leave the registry, the lower and upper bounds were 
arbitrarily chosen. Feely and Moon provided the 95% confidence intervals for the effect of media 
campaigns [149]. The range of probability that the family will authorize donation when it is known that the 
decedent had not joined the registry is described in footnote 2 in Table 7. Registrants’ age distribution and 
the probability of dying an eligible death are predicted probability distribution tables similar to U.S. Life 
Table. Sensitivity of the model to key parameters is presented through tornado diagrams. 
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Table 14: Model Parameters 
Item Baseline Plausible Range Ref. 
Probabilities 
Family Authorization Model1 
If the family knows the patient is a registrant, family 
will authorize donation. 0.8919 0.7981 – 0.9522 [151] 
Even if the family knows the patient is not a 
registrant, family will authorize donation.  0.6528 0.5517 – 0.7529
2 
First-person Authorization Model3 
A registrant who dies an eligible death will become 
a donor. 1.0 N/A [41, 152] 
Individual leaves the donor registry. 0.001 0.0005 – 0.0015 Assmp. 
A registrant will die at a given age. U.S. Life Tables [153] 
An individual dies an eligible death Eligible death probability table [152] 
Age at the time of joining the registry 
Registrants through mass media campaigns Table of predicted probability that a registrant is of a particular age. 
Registrants through in-person outreach Table of predicted probability that a registrant is of a particular age. 
Effect of mass media campaigns 0.05 0.03 – 0.07 [149] 
Total Registrants 91,705 N/A 
Social discount rate 0.03 0.01 – 0.05 
1 For the family authorization model, the marginal probability is calculated by subtracting the probability that the 
family will authorize donation even if the family knows the patient is not a registrant (0.6528) from the probability 
that the family will authorize donation if the family knows the patient was a registrant (0.8919).  
2 The lower and upper limit of the range was determined from CORE’s conversion rate for non-registered eligible 
decedents for 2010, 2011 & 2012. The lower limit is the probability that the family authorizes donation for a non-
registered eligible decedent in 2010. The upper limit is from the year 2012. 
3 For first-person authorization, the marginal probability is calculated by subtracting the probability that the family 
will authorize donation even if the family knows the patient is not a registrant (0.6528) from the probability that an 
eligible registrant will become a donor under the first-person authorization model (1.0). 
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3.3. RESULTS 
3.3.1. Costs 
All cost estimates with the exception of cost per registrant are rounded off to the nearest thousand. 
Over the three-year period CORE spent $3,049,000 on promoting the donor registry.  
3.3.2. Registrants & Cost per Registrant (Base Case) 
An estimated 6,708 individuals joined the registry during the study period. Of these, 2,458 
individuals joined the registry at an in-person outreach event either by signing the donor card or online 
through mobile devices and 4,250 registered at the DMV or online as a result of exposure to media 
campaigns. Steps in computation of the central estimates are presented in Table 15. The mean age of 
registrants through the media campaigns was 40.4 years and of registrants from in-person outreach was 
41.3 years. The cost of registering any individual is $455 which is less than Howard and Byrne’s estimate 
of the monetary value of a 65 year old registrant ($478), the least valuable registrant.   
Table 15: Total registrations from public education 
Total new registrants in CORE’s DSA (from Appendix H) 91,705 
Step 1 New registrants from in-person outreach 2,458 
Step 2 Net registrants after excluding registrants from in-person outreach 91,705 – 2,458  =    89,247 
Step 3 Registrations attributable to media campaigns @4.762% [149] 89,247 * 0.04762 =      4,250 
Step 4 Total registrations from public education 4,256 + 2,458 =      6,708 
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3.3.3. Donors and Cost per Donor (Base Case) 
First-Person Authorization 
Under the first-person authorization model, the 6,708 individuals who joined the registry as a result 
of CORE’s promotion activities will result in 8.2 donors after 23 years of joining the registry. After 
discounting at 3 percent for the fact that the benefits accrued in future have a lesser present-day value, these 
equal 4.2 present-day donors. That is, 1,597 registrants will result in 1 present-day donor. If all registrants 
were 18 years old, they would result in 5 present-day donors. The cost per donor for a 41-year old registrant 
is $726,000 compared to Mendeloff et al.’s estimate of the donor’s monetary value to the society of 
$1,086,000.  
Family Authorization 
Under the family-authorization model, the 6,708 registrants will result in 5.4 donors after 23 years 
of joining the registry, which is equal to 2.8 present-day donors after discounting at 3%. That is, 2,396 
registrants will result in 1.0 preset-day donor. If all registrants were 18 years old, they would result in 3.2 
present-day donors. For our average registrant, who is 41 years old, the cost per present-day donor is 
$1,089,000 which is very close to Mendeloff et al.’s estimate of the donor’s monetary value to the society 
of $1,086,000.  
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3.3.4. Sensitivity Analyses 
Monte Carlo probabilistic sensitivity analysis indicates that 95% of estimates of additional 
registrants are bounded within 5,429 and 7,956 registrants. Accordingly, the cost varies from $383 to $562 
per registrant. For the number of donors, the results from one-way sensitivity analysis are presented as 
tornado diagrams in Figure 6 (first-person authorization) and Figure 7 (family authorization).  
Figure 6: One-way sensitivity analysis of key model parameters (first-person authorization) 
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Figure 7: One-way sensitivity analysis of key model parameters (family authorization) 
Probabilistic sensitivity analysis of the number of additional donors indicates a 95% confidence 
interval of 2.5 to 6.6 donors under the first-person authorization model with cost per donor ranging between 
$462,000 and $1,220,000. Under the family authorization model, the 95% confidence interval spans from 
1.3 to 4.8 donors and the cost per donor falls between $635,000 and $2,345,000. Figure 8 presents the 
probability distribution of expected donors under the two authorization models.  
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Figure 8: Additional donors under the first-person and family authorization models 
3.4. DISCUSSION 
In spite of concerted efforts of the organ donation community to promote state donor registries, less 
than half of all Americans have signed up as organ donors even though over 90% endorse organ donation 
as a positive altruistic choice [156]. In 2012, there were only 108 million individuals on state donor 
registries nationwide, that is only 45 percent of all individuals 18 years and older [77]. While Pennsylvania 
is slightly better than the national average (46 percent), only 35 percent of individuals 18 years and older 
are registered donors in West Virginia [77]. In the last decade, OPOs nationwide have invested considerable 
resources in promoting the registry with the belief that additional registrations will have a positive impact 
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on donor supply. However as we have discussed earlier, determining the relationship between registrants 
and donors can be tricky. 
Previously, Beasley et al. have proposed a simple analytical model to estimate the number of new 
registrations required to generate one additional donor [157]. They estimated that 83,300 new registrants 
will produce one incremental donor in the same year under a 100% efficient system where each potential 
donor is identified and referred, and a request for donation is made to the family [157]. In contrast, using 
the same assumptions (100% efficient system, family can refuse donation), we estimated that 2,396 
registrants are needed to generate one present-day donor (6708 donors result in 2.8 present-day donors). 
Our examination of this enormous difference reveals following critical differences between the two models. 
First, Beasley et al. have used crude probability of death that takes into account the very low probability of 
death in children after infancy (p=0.008). In contrast, we have used age-adjusted death rate on a registrant 
population that was 18 years or older (crude p=0.0096) suggesting that individuals in our model die sooner 
(less effect of social discounting). Second, the probability of a decedent being an eligible donor in Beasley 
et al.’s analysis is 0.0075 while the same probability in our analysis after adjusting for age distribution of 
the registrants is 0.05. This difference is probably the biggest contributor to the discrepancy between 
Beasley et al.’s model and our model. The high probability of a decedent being an eligible donor in our 
model is largely due to two reasons. First, we have included all eligible deaths regardless of whether they 
are brain-dead or not while Beasely et al. included only the brain-dead donors. In CORE’s decedent records, 
the probability that a decedent is a brain-dead eligible decedent is 0.005 while the probability that a decedent 
is any type of eligible death is 1.7 times higher (p=0.0085). If we had considered only brain-dead donors, 
we would underestimate the number of donors that will result from the registrants. Second, young 
registrants (between 18 and 30 years) are overrepresented in our cohort of registrants when compared with 
the national estimates. In our simulated cohort, 36% of registrants are between the age of 18 years and 30 
years. Within this age group, the probability of a decedent being an eligible donor is 0.07, more than 9 times 
higher than the overall probability of 0.0075 in Beasley et al.’s model.  
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3.4.1. Donor Registry Promotion- Outcome and its Cost 
Compared to Howard and Byrne’s estimate of $840 for the value of one 18 year old registrant under 
the family-authorization model [142], we estimated the cost of registering one individual of any age at 
$455. This is lower than Howard & Byrne’s estimated monetary value of a 65+ registrant at $478. This 
means that even if all registrants were 65 years old, CORE’s public education strategy would cost less than 
the society is willing to pay for an additional registrant. We also estimated that under the first-person 
authorization model, CORE’s promotion efforts would generate 4.2 present-day donors at a cost of 
$726,000 per donor. This estimate of cost per donor is 33% less than the monetary value of one donor that 
Mendelof et al. had estimated ($1,086,000). However under the family authorization model, the cost of 
generating one donor increased to $1,089,000 surpassing Mendeloff et al.’s estimate by a narrow margin 
of $3,000. However if all the registrants were 18 years old, our estimates of cost per donor under the family 
authorization model would remain under the Mendeloff et al.’s estimate.  
Following points should be considered before interpreting the above comparisons. First, the family 
authorization model is much less relevant to our analysis than the first-person authorization model. The fact 
that CORE converted every deceased registrant who was eligible for donation into an organ donor during 
the study period suggests CORE’s preference for first-person authorization model when an eligible 
decedent is a registered donor. While we do not have access to CORE’s decedent records predating our 
study period to corroborate this observation, Beard et al. have noted CORE’s atypical behavior as an 
exception in the OPO community as far back as 2006 [158]. Second, although our analysis suggests that 
CORE’s registry promotion offers good return on investment, our cost per donor reflects the cost of 
“securing” one donor which only guarantees that an eligible decedent will become an organ donor. However 
for this to happen, a series of procedures must take place. These include identification and referral of 
imminent-death patients, brain death testing, optimum donor management and request for donation. Every 
process incurs additional costs that are borne by the clinical services department of CORE and have not 
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been considered in our analysis. In addition, several of CORE’s personnel are involved in educating critical 
care staff at over 100 hospitals in their service area. The efficiency of these hospitals in the procurement 
process is, in part, a function of professional education. The true cost of “procuring” one donor should 
include these costs as well. We do not have information on the cost of these processes but if we could 
include these in our analysis, our estimates of the first-person authorization model would shift in the 
direction of Mendeloff et al.’s estimate. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the costs would escalate so much 
that they will surpass the monetary value society places on one donor. Overall, since the return on registry 
promotion in terms of monetary value of a donor is greater than the investment, promoting donor registries 
appears to be a good bargain for the society. 
A more fundamental observation is that CORE’s donor registry promotion has a positive impact 
on the supply of organ donors. This observation is in direct conflict with Beard et al.’s argument that the 
resources spent on organ donation education do not increase the supply of cadaveric donors, at least not 
anymore [159]. Using ordinary least squares regression, Beard et al. have estimated the effect of public 
education expenditure on donors per 1000 hospital deaths at the DSA level. After controlling for population 
size, race, education, income, region of the U.S., and professional education expenses in their analysis, 
these authors did not find public education expenditures to be significantly associated with donation rate 
per 1000 deaths.  
The first reason these authors posit is that public education programs have been in existence for 
several years so their effect would progressively decrease according to the law of diminishing returns. 
However this would not hold true if public education also encourages the community members to join the 
donor registry, for two reasons. First, each year there is a steady stream of 16-year olds who are eligible to 
join the registry and there is no evidence that baseline registration rate will be sustained if exposure to pro-
donation messages is stopped. Second, assuming that the baseline registration rate is sustained, the law of 
diminishing returns applies only if the public education strategy remains unchanged. Present public 
outreach activities are more focused and target ethnic and racial minorities and older adults, who are more 
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resistant to the idea of organ donation as well as young adults who are underrepresented on the donor 
registries.  
The second reason Beard et al. give is that public education programs target the entire population 
while only a fraction of the population will ever have to make a decision about donation [159]. Verble and 
Worth also make this point in arguing that spending should be increased on professional education rather 
than public education because the former offers a more targeted approach while the latter is broader and 
therefore less effective [160]. But this is true for any type of effort that uses mass media. For instance, 
prescription drug manufactures often target a wide population base with advertising although only a small 
fraction of the population is expected to ever make a decision on brand. The fact that manufacturers continue 
to spend heavily on such advertisements strongly suggests that it has the desired effect. By analogy, even a 
small effect of public education on the number of organ donor designations can have an important impact 
on the number of actual donors. In fact if public education encourages people to join the donor registry that, 
in theory, guarantees organ donation when eligible; then public education’s protective effect against family 
refusal offers a clear advantage over professional education. 
3.4.2. Study Assumptions 
Assumptions concerning the model parameters have been discussed before. In addition, we made 
two assumptions that guided our model development. The first assumption we made is that the media 
campaign reached the entire service area’s population. Based on the summary of CORE’s media purchases, 
CORE’s pro-donation messages were relayed over 3 television stations and 20 radio stations [96]. In 
addition, outdoor messaging was placed in 212 locations and online campaigns were launched on Google® 
and Facebook® [96]. The pro-donation messages were relayed 3,087 times through the radio stations alone. 
Further, the public education program reached more than 5.5 million people, the entire population of 
CORE’s service area. Before we used these estimates, we tested if this extent of reach was even possible. 
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As a reality check, we assumed that CORE could comprehensively reach only 20% of the counties. We 
further assumed that to maximize the effect of their media campaign, CORE would target counties with the 
greatest potential, those with the largest populations. Our calculations indicate that 79 percent of new 
drivers and state ID holders came from only 20 percent of the counties in CORE’s service area (16 out of 
81 counties). We inferred that a well thought-out campaign strategy could reach the entire service area 
population.  
The second assumption we made is that the system of identification and referral of potential donors 
is 100% efficient. We believe this is a reasonable assumption for several reasons. First, OPO personnel who 
are responsible for public education regularly conduct retrospective review of medical records for eligible 
deaths. If eligible decedents are identified, they are noted and remedial measures are employed. As a result, 
some of the unidentified pool is captured and reflects in the lower conversion rate of eligible deaths to organ 
donors. Second, the loss of eligible decedents is a function of hospital-centered processes (and professional 
education) rather than public education. Adjusting for this loss in the analysis would penalize the 
effectiveness of public education programs. Third, this assumption introduces minimal bias in our 
estimates. This is because since we have used incremental probability of an eligible registrant becoming a 
donor, any loss of donors during the identification and referral process would be scaled down to the 
magnitude of incremental probability. This is illustrated with the following hypothetical situation. Suppose 
the probability of family authorizing donation is 1.0 for registrants and 0.75 for non-registrants, and the 
probability of an eligible donor not being identified / referred is 0.2. If we used the absolute probability of 
becoming a donor then the true effect of education programs would be 20 percentage points less than our 
estimates (1.0 x 0.2 = 0.2). However, if we used the incremental probability (1.0 - 0.75 = 0.25) to measure 
the effect, the true effect would be only 5 percentage points less than our estimates (0.25 x 0.2 = 0.05). 
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3.4.3. Do Additional Registrants Equal Additional Donors? 
Howard and Byrne note that people who are likely to become organ donors are unlikely to register 
[142]. Consequently, current registrants are under-represented in the potential and actual donor pools. To 
test if our analysis is affected by this phenomenon, we compared the proportion of eligible deceased 
registrants in CORE’s decedent records (2010 thru 2012) with the registration rate in CORE’s service area. 
From 2010 through 2012 in CORE’s service area, 35 percent of the eligible decedents were registered 
donors compared to 44 percent of drivers/state ID holders (2012) suggesting that under-representation of 
registrants is in fact affecting our analysis. But when we restrict our analysis to individuals 18 years and 
older and living in CORE’s DSA, we find that 38 percent of eligible decedents are registered donors 
compared to 40 percent of those alive. These findings suggest that the registrants in CORE’s service area 
are only slightly under-represented in the eligible death and donor pools. The interpretation is that currently 
non-registered individuals in CORE’s DSA do not differ from those on the state registries in their 
probability of dying an eligible death. For this reason, the society will value a “marginal” registrant 
(someone who is not currently registered) at the same level as current registrants.  
3.4.4. Sensitivity Analyses 
We tested the sensitivity of our model to only those parameters that did not vary with the 
individual’s age of joining the registry. The age-dependent probability of death and the age-dependent 
predicted probability of dying an eligible death were excluded for this reason. Another parameter that we 
excluded from the sensitivity analysis was the probability that an eligible deceased registrant will become 
a donor under first-person authorization since this parameter, by definition, cannot assume any value other 
than 1. The first-person authorization model was most sensitive to the social discount rate followed by age. 
With the mean age of 40.7 years, an average registrant is expected to live for 40 more years, which explains 
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the model’s sensitivity to changing values of the social discount rate. Under the family authorization model, 
the probability that the family will authorize donation for a non-registrant has the greatest influence 
followed by social discount rate and age of the registrant. Since we have used marginal probabilities in our 
analysis, the value of a registrant under this model depends on the difference in the probability of the family 
authorizing donation for a registrant (0.8919) and that of a non-registrant (0.6528). Compared to the first-
person authorization model where the marginal probability is 0.3472 (1.0 - 0.6528), the marginal probability 
under the family authorization model is 0.2391 (0.8919 – 0.6528). This means that for an identical increase 
in the probability of family authorizing donation for a non-registrant, there is greater percentage reduction 
in the marginal probability under the family authorization model which explains the model’s sensitivity.  
Monte Carlo probabilistic sensitivity analysis indicates that younger registrants are more valuable 
than older registrants in terms of future organ donors. At any age assuming a constant authorization rate, 
the trade-off between the risk of death and the probability of dying an eligible death determines the overall 
probability of becoming a donor. While the risk of death increases with age, the probability of dying an 
eligible death decreases. Since the probability of dying an eligible death diminishes faster than the risk of 
death increases, younger registrants are valued more than the older registrants in the model. In Figure 10, 
we have presented the density distribution of expected number of donors. The expected values of donors 
under the first-person and family authorization model considerably overlap owing to our distributional 
specifications and a small magnitude of difference in the mean expected number of donors under the two 
models of authorization. Given the extent of overlap, the two simulated samples will not be significantly 
different in statistical terms. One explanation for this insignificance is that there is actually no difference 
between the two models and that it doesn’t matter whether an OPO goes ahead with donation in an eligible 
deceased registrant or defers the decision to the family. Alternatively, the distributions used for the 
sensitivity analyses should be more tightly specified.  
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3.4.5.  Average Costs and Effects vs. Incremental Costs and Effects 
According to Drummond et al. [161], studies that do not have a comparison strategy (including this 
study) classify as a “cost-outcomes description” which is a partial economic evaluation. We want to point 
out that although we did not have a comparison strategy, this analysis is a special case of cost-effectiveness 
analysis since the costs and effects in our analysis represent incremental rather than average costs and 
effects. Using registrants in our analysis to illustrate this point, the number of individuals who signed the 
donor registry as a result of CORE’s promotion efforts was estimated from two sources. For the in-person 
outreach, CORE provided us a list of 2,458 individuals who either signed the donor card or registered online 
at the event. Had CORE not reached out to these individuals, it is unlikely that they would have joined the 
donor registry. These 2,458 individuals therefore represent the incremental benefit generated by CORE’s 
promotion strategy. For the media campaigns, we had used Feeley and Moon’s effect of media campaigns 
on registrations [149]. They found that communities exposed to media campaigns have 5% more 
registrations than those not exposed to media campaigns [149]. That is, media campaigns have a 5% 
incremental effect. Together, the in-person outreach and media campaigns generated 6,708 registrants in 
incremental benefit. For estimating the cost of registry promotion, we had assumed that the cost of operating 
the online database is zero since most state donor registries are appended to existing DMV information 
technology systems. Howard and Byrne also note that while the costs of operating the registry are unknown, 
the cost of enrolling registrants requires minimal “administrative machinery” [142]. Accordingly, we did 
not include “no promotion” as a comparison strategy in our analysis since the cost per registrant and cost 
per donor of this strategy would always be zero. Had we included the “no promotion” strategy in the 
analysis, the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) would be calculated as: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 −  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
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Since the cost of not promoting the registry would be zero, the incremental cost of promotion would 
be what CORE had spent on promoting the registry. The incremental benefit would be the number of 
individuals who joined the registry as a result of CORE’s promotion efforts. If we substitute these values 
in the above mathematical formula, the ICER would equal to $455 per registrant, and by extension, 
$726,000 per donor (under first-person authorization) which is the same as our estimates without the 
comparison strategy. 
3.4.6. Limitations 
We have examined the cost of securing future donors from the perspective of the OPO but costs 
are incurred by other stakeholders too. Organizations like Donate Life America are nationally active in 
registry promotion. In addition, we are aware of at least two HRSA-funded projects to promote donor 
registry that were active in CORE’s service area during the study period. The results of these studies have 
not been published yet so we cannot say to what extent these projects increased the donor registration rate. 
Additionally, CORE relies heavily on its volunteers to promote donor registry. We were able to obtain these 
costs but did not include these in our analysis to keep the perspective of our analysis clearly defined. 
However, we examined the average number of volunteers that went to each event and the average number 
of hours they spent at each event (including two hours of travel time). Based on the minimum wages in PA 
and WV [162], we estimated that $34,000 worth of unpaid volunteer work was involved in community 
outreach. This is just 1% of CORE’s total spending on public education.   
The majority of parameters we used in our model are largely specific to CORE’s service area. An 
advantage of such specificity is that our estimates accurately represent the costs and effects of CORE’s 
public education program. A disadvantage is that our results lack generalizability to other OPO service 
areas or to national estimates. In fact, it is questionable if estimates from this type of analysis can ever be 
generalized to other OPOs given the variation in the baseline registration and donation rates, population 
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demographics and OPO management structures. Moreover, unlike one drug that may vary by dose, 
education programs can come in innumerable shapes and sizes. If the subject of the analysis is not 
comparable, it becomes extremely difficult to produce generalizable estimates. However, in lieu of 
generalizability, this paper serves as an analytical framework for other OPOs to examine the return on their 
investments in donor registry promotion. 
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CHAPTER 4:  IMPACT OF DONOR REGISTRY PROMOTION ON ORGAN SHORTAGE AND 
ITS ASSOCIATED COSTS 
4.1. BACKGROUND 
Current efforts to address the shortage of cadaveric organs have primarily relied on four 
approaches. These include transplanting organs from marginal donors, hospital development, improving 
the organ donation process, and promoting the donor registry [163-165]. Organs from marginal donors 
(non-standard criteria donors) have shown promise but their transplant is associated with poorer health 
outcomes [165]. Although their use is on the rise, the effect on the waiting list has been minimal since these 
organs are currently less readily accepted. OPOs have used hospital development to educate the critical care 
staff about their role in the donation process. The goal is to improve coordination on donor cases and 
minimize process failures. Its impact on organ shortage is limited by the high rate of nursing staff turnover 
in hospitals. In addition, hospital development is costly due to the need for repeated exposure of nursing 
staff to donation education. Improvements in the organ donation process brought about through the organ 
donation breakthrough collaborative [51-54, 81] and required request and referral legislation (42 CFR §482) 
have markedly increased the conversion of potential donors to actual donors. In recent years however, the 
conversion rate has plateaued at less than 100% primarily because of factors affecting family authorization 
that are outside the control of the OPOs and the hospitals [113, 115-118, 138, 139].  
Donor registry promotion is one frontier that has attracted much attention for its untapped potential. 
It is hypothesized that if more individuals participate in the registry, the problem of family refusal can be 
solved (provided first-person authorization is honored). OPOs and organizations like Donate Life America 
invest considerable resources in the promotion of donor registries. In recent years, HRSA has funded a large 
portfolio of research on innovative approaches to adding donors to the state registries. The premise behind 
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these efforts is that more donor designations will result in more organ donors. Recent DLA annual report 
suggests that this is actually happening. Nationwide participation in the donor registry has witnessed a 
steady rise with total participation in the donor registries crossing the 100 Million mark in 2011 [77]. 
According to the 2012 Donor Designation Report Card, the fraction of donors who had joined the registry 
before their death is also displaying an upward trend (28% in 2009, 33% in 2010, and 36% in 2011) [77]. 
 Our principal finding in chapter 3 that donor registry promotion results in additional donors also 
substantiates the presumption that additional registrants result in additional donors. In addition, our results 
suggest that donor registry promotion is cost-effective when compared to previously published estimates 
of a donor’s monetary value to the society [141]. In this paper we extend this analysis to the level of the 
organ. The extent to which registry promotion can impact the organ shortage, and its financial impact on 
the society have not been previously quantified. These relationships warrant examination for several 
reasons. For one, the transplant waiting list is a composite list of individuals who are waiting for one or 
more organs and the demand for some organs is more than others. Second, donors do not yield all organs 
equally. Some organs such as kidney are more frequently recovered than other organs. The interaction 
between these two factors has important implications on the extent to which shortage of specific organs is 
addressed as well as the costs incurred.  
In this paper, we examine two key issues: 1) what is the maximum potential effect on organ shortage 
that we can achieve through registry promotion (we refer to this as the “impact threshold”); and 2) what is 
the cost of reaching the impact threshold (budget impact)? The impact threshold of registry promotion is 
benchmarked against the goal of arresting the growth of the transplant waiting list. At present, the prospects 
of supplying enough organs to clear the waiting list are gloomy. A more reasonable goal for the society 
would be to arrest the growth of the transplant waiting list. The implication of this exercise can be illustrated 
as follows: If greater investment in registry promotion can yield enough organs to arrest the growth in 
waiting list, then parallel advancements in transplant medicine that aim to increase organ supply (for 
instance, further expansion of the donor pool or increasing the use of marginal organs) can potentially 
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shrink the waiting list. Our intent in this paper is to initiate a discussion on whether donor registry promotion 
has the potential to address the organ shortage in a meaningful manner and if the associated costs are 
affordable.  
4.2. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
The impact threshold of donor registry promotion and the associated cost were examined from the 
perspective of an OPO. We used data from a typical OPO located in the mid-Atlantic region of the United 
States. The Center for Organ Recovery and Education (CORE) is one of the 58 federally designated OPOs; 
it serves western Pennsylvania and most of West Virginia. For this analysis, we focused on the four major 
solid organs including kidney, liver, lung and heart. We excluded pancreas from our analysis since it is 
typically transplanted either simultaneously with or following a kidney transplant. Small intestines were 
also excluded since they too are typically part of multi-visceral transplants. In addition, we assume that all 
organs are intended to be single organ transplants.   
4.2.1. Impact threshold of registry promotion on organ shortage 
If there are no budget constraints and assuming that there is a constant rate of positive marginal 
return on investment in the donor registry, any number of organs desired can be secured by spending more 
on registry promotion. This is depicted by line segment AE in Figure 10. Under this assumption, the number 
of additional donors secured by investing greater resources in registry promotion has no ceiling. 
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Figure 9: Marginal return on investments in registry promotion 
In reality however, the number of incremental donors will progressively decrease as more money 
is invested in registry promotion (arc ABC) according to the law of diminishing marginal return. Let us 
assume that point Q represents the impact threshold. That is, Q represents the maximum number of donors 
that can be secured through registry promotion. At point Q, the identified potential donor pool is completely 
realized (conversion rate equals 100%) and no additional donors can be secured by investing more resources 
in donor registry promotion since the marginal return on investment in registry promotion beyond this point 
will equal zero. Therefore the true marginal return on investment in donor registry promotion assumes the 
line ABCD. For simplification, we assume that marginal return on donor registry is represented by a 
constant return on investment up to the point Q (line AC) beyond which the marginal return equals zero 
(line ACD). The point P represents the marginal cost of securing the Qth donor and the rectangle QAPC 
represents the total cost of reaching the threshold impact. 
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To estimate the number of additional donors that are secured before reaching point Q, we conducted 
a retrospective analysis of CORE’s decedent records for the year 2010 through 2012. During this period, 
324 (standard criteria donors) out of the 424 brain-dead eligible decedents became organ donors and 100 
eligible decedents were lost to family refusal. If infinite resources were invested into donor registry 
promotion, then all eligible decedents would be registered decedents and the 100 decedents that were lost 
to family refusal would become organ donors under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. When these 100 
donors are realized, the identified donor pool would be exhausted and no more donors would result. That 
is, unlimited donor registry promotion would result, at maximum, in 30.9% more donors (100/324). From 
2010 through 2012, CORE’s DSA has produced, on an average, 206 donors annually (includes standard 
criteria, expanded criteria and non-brain dead donors). If CORE had an unlimited budget, the benefits from 
CORE’s expansion of registry promotion would be limited to 64 additional donors (30.9% of 206)27.  
The average yield of each type of organ from a donor from CORE’s DSA is listed in Table 1. 
According to Table 1, the 64 additional donors would have yielded 73 kidneys, 45 livers, 18 lungs and 15 
hearts. This is the maximum number of each type of organ that would be secured even if CORE invested 
in registry promotion beyond rectangle QAPC. This is the impact threshold of donor registry promotion in 
CORE’s DSA with the current identified potential donor pool. 
27 For CMS reporting purposes, non-standard criteria donors are considered eligible deaths only if they become donors, 
therefore the observed conversion rate for non-standard criteria potential donors is always 100%. However we 
assume that the unobserved conversion rate of non-standard criteria potential donors will be similar to the observed 
conversion rate of standard criteria potential donors. Therefore improvement in conversion rate will result in 
additional standard criteria as well as non-standard criteria donors. 
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Table 16: Total organs transplanted and organs transplanted per donor 
From 618 
Donors 
OrgTxDon* 
Kidneys 702 1.14 
Liver 433 0.70 
Lung 175 0.28 
Heart 144 0.23 
All organs 1454 2.35 
* OrgTxDon is organs transplanted per donor calculated by dividing the total
number of organs by the number of donors. 
There were 618 deceased donors in CORE’s service area (2010 – 2012). 
If improvements in identification and referral of potential donors expand the identified potential 
donor pool, then the impact threshold will rise. In Figure 10, the new impact threshold is represented by Q’ 
and the new marginal return on investment is defined by line ABC’D’. Sheehy et al. estimated that in 1999, 
there were 13,317 potential brain-dead donors among 2.4 million deaths in the United States [70, 90]. 
Assuming that this rate has not changed significantly over time and is representative of CORE’s DSA, 
CORE should identify, on an average, 155 deaths as eligible brain-dead donors out of the 28,000 deaths 
reported annually. In reality, CORE identified 141 brain-dead eligible deaths annually during 2010 through 
2012. At the current conversion rate of 76.4%, 11 out of the 14 now identifiable eligible deaths would 
become organ donors but the remaining 3 donors could potentially be secured through investment in registry 
promotion. Under Sheehy et al.’s estimates, the impact threshold of registry promotion would be reached 
at 67 donors who would yield 76 kidneys, 47 livers, 19 lungs and 15 hearts. 
4.2.2. Impact threshold compared to the benchmark of arresting waiting list growth 
As of May 30th, 2014, there were 2,738 patients waiting for an organ transplant in CORE’s DSA. 
Of these 2,055 patients need a kidney transplant, 523 patients need a liver, 78 patients are waiting for a 
heart and 82 patients require a lung transplant [1]. Since these are active waiting list registrations, the only 
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factor preventing these individuals from getting off the waiting list is the availability of a suitable organ. 
Each year more patients are added to the waiting list. While many individuals are removed from the waiting 
list for various reasons, many more are added each year. 
Using waiting list data from Organ Procurement and Transplant Network [1], we calculated a three-
year average (2010-2012) of waiting list additions and removals in CORE’s DSA. For the number of people 
added to the waiting list, we aggregated new registrations on the waiting list from 2010 through 2012 and 
divided it by 3 to obtain the average annual additions to the waiting list. For removal from waiting list, we 
defined removals as only those individuals who were removed because they received a transplant in the 
United States or their condition improved that made them ineligible for a transplant. Individuals who died 
while waiting for a transplant or received a transplant in another country, and those who became too sick 
for a transplant were not considered as removals. Removal for these reasons from the waiting list is not an 
indicator of organ supply. Table 19 presents the average additions and removals as well as the net growth 
in the waiting list by organs in CORE’s DSA. The impact threshold of donor registry promotion with the 
current donor pool is presented in the last row.   
Table 17: Average additions, removals, and growth in the waiting list by organ 
Total Kidney Liver Heart Lung 
Waiting List Additions 1269 664 350 93 162 
Waiting List Removals 900 428 248 85 139 
Net Growth 369 236 102 8 23 
Impact Threshold (Current potential donor pool) 151 73 45 15 17 
Except for heart, the net growth in the demand for organs exceeds the impact threshold of registry 
promotion. Since it is not possible to secure more organs than the impact threshold, the cost of arresting the 
growth in the waiting list is irrelevant and the costs are capped at the threshold impact. 
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4.3.  DISCUSSION 
Donor registry promotion is widely regarded as the remedy for the growing waiting list problem. 
The goal of this paper was to examine the maximum possible impact that registry promotion can have on 
organ shortage and the cost of reaching that impact threshold. Our results suggest that donor registry 
promotion can increase the supply of organs but the net growth in demand far outstrips the potential supply 
(except in the case of hearts). In addition, reaching the impact threshold alone is prohibitively expensive. 
According to our estimates, CORE would need to invest around $46 million to reach the impact threshold 
that is 46 times their current budget of community outreach, and represents an unrealistic level of spending. 
This analysis (in conjunction with chapter 3) demonstrates that large-scale implementation of even 
the cost-effective programs can have significant impact on societal budget. Previously Mendeloff et al. 
estimated that up to $1 million could be spent on procuring one additional donor (based on the value of one 
QALY at $100,000) [141].  In Chapter 3, we found that the cost of securing this additional donor was 
$726,000. Even if the cost of organ recovery (approximately $100,000 at $25,000 for each organ) were 
added [141], it is unlikely that the total cost of procuring the additional donor would exceed $1 million. To 
put the cost of securing one donor in the perspective of medical treatments that society routinely pays for, 
we conducted an ancillary analysis to estimate the cost of registry promotion in terms quality-adjust life 
years (Appendix K). We estimated that the cost of securing one quality-adjusted life year is $66,500. In 
comparison, recent estimates of cost-effectiveness of renal dialysis, a traditional benchmark for comparing 
cost-effectiveness, indicates an average cost of $129,000 per QALY [166]. We therefore concluded that 
CORE’s donor registry promotion is cost-effective. But if registry promotion efforts are to be to be 
expanded to maximize their impact, the aggregate cost becomes prohibitive.  
Nevertheless investing in registry promotion offers some advantages. In CORE’s DSA, joining the 
state registry guarantees organ donation if a decedent is eligible. In comparison, educating the critical care 
staff or improving the organ donation process only improves the probability of donation but do not 
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guarantee it. In other words, some eligible decedents who are not on the donor registry will always be lost 
due to family refusal regardless of how efficient the organ donation process is or how effectively CORE 
educates the critical care staff. One implication of this assessment is that based on the costs and outcomes 
of critical care staff education and the organ donation process, CORE might be able to allocate its resources 
more efficiently. However, this area needs further research.    
Policy reforms to increase donation rates have primarily focused on two proposals, the presumed 
consent model and the free-market approach.  
4.3.1. Presumed Consent 
Under the presumed consent model, all individuals are considered to have authorized donation 
unless they take affirmative action to opt-out. Although the final say on donation rests with the potential 
donor’s family, Abadie and Gay (2006) have demonstrated that countries with presumed consent have 25-
30% higher donation rates than informed consent countries. Their conclusion was based on analysis of 
donation rates and other potential factors affecting organ donation in 22 countries over 10 years. They 
however note that if the population’s strong preference for donation results in passage of presumed consent 
legislation, then the causal effect is likely to be overestimated.   
4.3.2. Paying Donors 
Many economists have criticized the dependence of the current procurement system on altruistic 
donation. They argue that the current shortage of organs is a result of setting the price of cadaveric organs 
at zero. Economists, in general, argue that a market for cadaveric organs where the price is allowed to rise 
to market-clearing levels is the answer to the organ shortage [167-174]. Beard et al. (2008), in their 
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particularly severe critique of the current procurement policy, claim that all major efforts and legislations 
including increased expenditure on public education, donor cards, required request and referral legislation, 
the breakthrough collaborative, and reimbursing (but not rewarding) donors for the costs they incur are a 
part of “illusionary responsiveness” [174]. That is, these efforts are not intended to address the organ 
shortage but are designed to create the illusion that a serious effort is being made. Indeed, in their opinion, 
and truly so, parties like the dialysis clinics, organ procurement organizations, investigators who receive 
funding for xenograft research, and even transplant centers have significant financial interests in 
maintaining status quo [174]. The imbalance of economic and political power between the procurement and 
transplantation industry, and the 134,000 people with end-stage organ failure ensures that the status quo is 
maintained [174]. These authors conclude that only a free market approach can satisfactorily address the 
problem of organ shortage. 
Howard, in his review of procurement policy reform proposals, identifies two modes of 
compensation for organ donation [175]. The first is to financially reward individuals who join the donor 
registry. Cohen [170] and Hansmann [171] describe this as “futures market” where the individuals receive 
a payment for agreeing to donate their organs should they die an eligible death in the future. However, the 
involvement of the family in decision making complicates this idea. In the absence of a payment for 
registration, the donor family will correctly interpret that the patient registered because of the intent to 
donate [176]. With payment, the “signal becomes distorted,” and family may not trust the authenticity of 
the donor designation decision [176]. In theory, therefore, payments for joining the registry may actually 
reduce family authorization rates [175] unless the first-person authorization model is strictly adhered to. 
The second form of compensation is to offer financial incentives to families of eligible decedents. Critics 
argue that the apparent sale and purchase of organs will offend those donor families who want to donate 
for altruistic reasons and will result in their crowding-out [175]. However a financial reward that 
acknowledges superior performance and the value of the contribution made can reinforce the intrinsic 
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altruistic motivation for donation [177]. Furthermore, an in-kind payment (example funeral benefit) may 
lead to less crowding-out than a cash payment [175].  
It is highly unlikely, however, that either presumed consent or a free-market approach will solve 
organ shortage. The fundamental reason for this observation is that there are simply not enough people 
dying in a manner that makes them suitable to become an organ donor. Thus, other approaches are required 
to address the organ shortage.    
4.3.3. Living Donation 
A free market has the potential, in theory, to increase the number of living kidney and partial liver 
donors.  Although historically, living donors have been an important source of kidneys, their number has 
not increased much in the last decade. In fact it has averaged around 6,000 over the last 12 years (6,045 in 
2001 compared with 5,732 in 2013). Becker and Elias (2006), strong proponents of free markets in living 
donation, have estimated that the market price of a kidney from a living donor is around $15,000 [178].  
Since living donors are an important source of kidneys (34% of kidneys in 2013 were sourced from living 
donors), allowing the price of organs to rise to a market clearing level has the potential to increase the 
supply, assuming the donors respond to financial incentives. 
Critiques of a free-market approach in living donation point out two issues with this idea. The first 
issue is that living donors are may experience adverse health consequences. There is currently a lack of 
clinical research on the long-term consequence of donation. Anecdotal reports of mortality associated with 
living liver donation have had a chilling effect [179, 180].  In surveys of living donors in India and Iran, a 
considerable proportion of respondents reported adverse health effects (48% and 60% respectively) [181, 
182]. Becker and Elias note that the healthcare in low-income developing countries is hardly comparable 
to the standards in developed countries where living kidney donors have reported excellent health in the 
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long-term [183]. This is no substitute, however, for high quality longitudinal research.  The second issue is 
that a free-market approach in living donation entails risk of economic exploitation. That is, the current 
economic divide in society will segregate the benefactors (donors) from the beneficiaries (recipients, health 
professionals etc.). Indeed, markets are prone to trade away equity for efficiency. Any step towards a free-
market approach would require extensive regulation to protect against economic exploitation. For example, 
incentivizing members of minority communities to become living donors can be potentially very risky if 
they themselves develop end stage disease. Given the high burden of disease in these communities, this 
type of policy may actually compound the problem. 
4.3.4. Increase In-Hospital Deaths 
In 2011, New York City conducted a six-month pilot project on using the Rapid Organ Recovery 
Ambulance to preserve the “newly dead” [184]. Many potential donors in the United States are lost because 
they die outside the hospital. The objective of the rapid organ recovery ambulance project was to readily 
identify potential donors who had joined the state registry, quickly transport them to a hospital and salvage 
transplantable kidneys. During the six months, nine deaths were considered but did not qualify mostly 
because the decedent had not joined the donor registry [184]. The research team is considering repeating 
the pilot study for lungs since lungs have a longer time window for recovery.  
4.3.5. Improve Organ Yield 
 In 2013, NIH-funded research on ways to perfuse and ventilate lungs outside the body included a 
proof-of-concept pilot project to test if potentially transplantable lungs could be recovered and transported 
from non-hospital cardiac deaths by the EMS crew [185]. Unlike other organs, lungs do not depend on 
perfusion for cellular respiration as long as they are ventilated [186]. The objective of the study is to 
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examine if lungs that are recovered at the site of death and transported to the hospital maintain acceptable 
organ function.  
4.3.6. Increase Non-Standard Criteria Donors 
The most recent legislative effort to expand the potential donor pool has come in the form of the 
HIV Organ Policy Equity (HOPE) Act that was signed into law on November 21st, 2013. This Act legalizes 
research in organ transplants between HIV-positive individuals with the goal to strengthen the supply of 
organs in the future [187]. However, given the small fraction of HIV positive donors and recipients, the 
HOPE act appears to be more symbolic than pragmatic.  
4.3.7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have considered several ways in which the number of organs available for 
transplant could be increased by improving the efficiency of the procurement system.  However, these 
approaches are unlikely to make a significant impact on the overall waiting list, either in terms of the overall 
registrations or the annual additions. A fundamental question remains, therefore, over the underlying source 
of the waiting list growth. Although the transplant waiting list has continued to grow since its inception, its 
growth, in and of itself, cannot be attributed to inefficiencies in the procurement system. Growth in the 
waiting list is also due to the expanding application of organ transplantation to new conditions. In addition, 
OPTN allocation policies that are intended to balance equity and net health benefits can affect the size of 
the waiting list. For instance since 2004, most of the increase in waitlisted ESRD patients has been due to 
the addition of ‘inactive’ patients [188]. These are the patients who meet the clinical criteria of having an 
end-stage disease, but are not ready for an immediate transplant (e.g., due to an active infection or an 
incomplete evaluation). This was in part because of the change in the OPTN policy, that in 2003, permitted 
waitlisted ESRD patients to accumulate waiting time points. In addition, improvements in medical care 
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such as better renal dialysis and the advent of bridging therapies (e.g. left ventricular assist device and 
implantable cardiac defibrillators) have helped waitlisted candidates live longer [189, 190]. Over several 
years, patients who would have been removed from the waiting list due to death or worsening of their health 
have contributed to the growth in the waiting list. The organ shortage we see is thus the result of more and 
more patients becoming, and remaining eligible for a transplant, a factor that is outside the control 
procurement system. Finally, a perverse incentive exists: if more organs become available for transplant, 
then physicians might be encouraged to add more patients to the waiting list, thus perpetuating the problem. 
Increasing the supply of organs for transplantation continues to be a valuable goal for the health 
care system. Every organ transplanted represents a patient who does not die from end stage disease. 
However, the increasing demand is anticipated to far outstrip the supply gains from potential donor pool 
expansion or improving the organ acceptance rate. Prevention of and early intervention in the underlying 
pathogenesis of organ failure remain the first line of defense.  
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION 
The remarkable progress of transplant medicine in the latter half of the twentieth century that led 
to an unprecedented demand for donated organs has caught the transplant community off-guard. In 
response, the organ donation community has evolved into a highly specialized organ procurement network 
driven by the legislative developments over the past 35 years. Primarily governed by the CMS Conditions 
of Participation and Conditions of Coverage, the organ procurement network strives to attain effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity through the well-defined roles and responsibilities of donor hospitals, transplant 
centers and the organ procurement organizations (OPOs).  
OPOs have many functions. These include training hospital staff in the donation process, educating 
the public and raising awareness about organ donation, and supporting donor families. Their defining role 
however is in the organ donation process where they function as a bridge between the donor hospitals and 
transplant centers. In chapter 2, we examined the impact of breakdown in the organ donation process on 
the availability of donors and organs. The principal finding was that process breakdowns have a strong 
adverse effect on the likelihood of organ donation but do not affect the organ yield once an eligible decedent 
becomes an organ donor. Nevertheless, process breakdowns exert a strong overall effect on organ 
availability. We found that for every process breakdown that occurred in an eligible decedent, one less 
organ was available for transplant. Consequently, 25 organs were lost to process breakdowns over the three-
year study period. Although reducing process breakdowns can potentially increase the availability of 
transplantable organs, some organ donors would still be lost owing to other factors that make families averse 
to the idea of organ donation.   
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Organ donor registries are widely regarded as a remedy to the problem of family refusal. When 
decedents have their name on the registry, family’s decision about donation is irrelevant owing to the legal 
guarantee afforded under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987. OPOs invest considerable resources in 
donor registry promotion by reaching out to their communities through in-person outreach and mass media 
campaigns. The premise behind adding donors to state registries is that more donor registrations will result 
in more organ donors. In reality, it is difficult to determine if the number of registrations generated is worth 
the money spent on promoting donor registries. In Chapter 3, we analyzed the cost of enrolling individuals 
into the donor registry (cost per registrant) and by extension to analyze the cost of securing organ donors 
for future (cost per donor). Compared to Howard and Byrne’s estimate of $840 for the value of one 18 year 
old registrant under the family-authorization model [142], we estimated the cost of registering one 
individual of any age at $455. We also estimated that under the first-person authorization model, CORE’s 
promotion efforts would generate 4.2 present day donors at a cost of $726,000 per donor. This estimate of 
cost per donor is 33% less than the monetary value of one donor that Mendeloff et al. had estimated 
($1,086,000) [141]. 
In chapter 4, we extended the analysis of chapter 3 to the level of the organ. The goal of this study 
was to analyze the cost and potential impact of donor registry promotion in relation to organ shortage.  Later 
these issues were analyzed in the context of arresting the growth of the transplant waiting list. Although 
donor registry promotion can increase the supply of organs, the potential increases in organ supply fall short 
of the net increase in waiting list. The threshold impact of registry promotion is reached at 64 donors that 
yield 73 kidneys, 45 livers, 18 lungs and 15 hearts. The cost of reaching the threshold impact is $46 million; 
this amount is 46 times CORE’s present community outreach budget. This study demonstrates that although 
registry promotion is cost-effective, its large-scale implementation will have significant impact on societal 
budget.   
The scope of this research was to examine the effectiveness and the efficiency of the organ 
procurement system as it operates under the current legislative framework. Although eliminating errors in 
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the organ donation process and promoting the donor registry will improve organ availability, these efforts 
alone cannot solve the growing waiting list problem. The fundamental reason why various approaches to 
increase the cadaveric organ supply have enjoyed limited success in reducing organ shortage is that there 
are simply not enough people dying in a manner that makes them suitable to become an organ donor. Since 
patients with end-stage renal disease represent almost 80 percent of all waiting list candidates, living kidney 
donation offers a promising avenue because of the potentially limitless pool of donors.   
Increasing the supply of organs for transplantation continues to be a valuable goal for the health 
care system. Every organ transplanted represents a patient who does not die from end-stage disease.  
However, the increasing demand is anticipated to far outstrip the supply gains from potential donor pool 
expansion or improving the organ acceptance rate. Prevention of and early intervention in the underlying 
pathogenesis of organ failure remain the first line of defense.  
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APPENDIX A: CMS EXCLUSIONARY CONDITIONS 
Exclusionary conditions are described in CMS Conditions for Coverage for Organ Procurement 
Organizations; Final Rule (71 Federal Register 30928). 
Active Infections 
Bacterial 
• Tuberculosis.
• Gangrenous bowel or perforated bowel
and/or intra-abdominal sepsis.
Viral 
• HIV infection by serologic or molecular
detection.
• Rabies.
• Reactive Hepatitis B Surface Antigen.
• Retroviral infections including HTLV
• I/II.
• Viral Encephalitis or Meningitis.
• Active Herpes simplex, varicella zoster, or
cytomegalovirus viremia or pneumonia.
• Acute Epstein Barr Virus (mononucleosis).
• West Nile Virus infection.
• Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
Fungal 
• Active infection with Cryptococcus,
Aspergillus, Histoplasma, Coccidioides.
• Active candidemia or invasive yeast
infection.
Parasites 
• Active infection with Trypanosoma cruzi
(Chagas’), Leishmania, Strongyloides, or
Malaria (Plasmodium sp.).
Prion 
• Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease.
General Exclusions 
• Aplastic Anemia.
• Agranulocytosis.
• Extreme Immaturity (<500 grams or
gestational age of <32 weeks).
• Current malignant neoplasms except non-
melanoma skin cancers such as basal cell and
squamous cell cancer and primary CNS
tumors without evident metastatic disease.
• Previous malignant neoplasms with current
evident metastatic disease.
• A history of melanoma.
• Hematologic malignancies: Leukemia,
Hodgkin’s Disease, Lymphoma, Multiple
Myeloma.
• Multi-system organ failure (MSOF) due to
overwhelming sepsis or MSOF without
sepsis defined as 3 or more systems in
simultaneous failure for a period of 24 hours
or more without response to treatment or
resuscitation.
• Active Fungal, Parasitic, viral, or Bacterial
Meningitis or encephalitis.
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APPENDIX B: GLASGOW COMA SCALE 
Eye Opening Response 
Spontaneous--open with blinking at baseline 4 points 
To verbal stimuli, command, speech 3 points 
To pain only (not applied to face) 2 points 
No response 1 point 
Verbal Response 
Oriented 5 points 
Confused conversation, but able to answer questions 4 points 
Inappropriate words 3 points 
Incomprehensible speech 2 points 
No response 1 point 
Motor Response 
Obeys commands for movement 6 points 
Purposeful movement to painful stimulus 5 points 
Withdraws in response to pain 4 points 
Flexion in response to pain (decorticate posturing) 3 points 
Extension response in response to pain (decerebrate posturing)  2 points 
No response 1 point 
Coma: No eye opening, no ability to follow commands, no word verbalizations (GCS Score: 3-8) 
Source: 
• Teasdale G, Jennett B. Assessment of coma and impaired consciousness. Lancet 1974; 81-84.
[191].
• Teasdale G, Jennett B. Assessment and prognosis of coma after head injury. Acta Neurochir 1976;
34:45-55. [192].
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APPENDIX C: EFFECTIVE REGISTRY CRITERIA 
1. No follow-up step required for DMV or online enrollment.
2. Active UAGA legislation that obligates OPOs to honor the registered decedent’s wishes.
3. 24/7 access to the online database for the OPOs to query donor designations.
4. Department of Motor Vehicles enrolls donors via all available channels to maximize
designation.
5. Dedicated website that allows individuals to enroll at any time.
6. Donor cards available for those individuals who do not have a driver’s license or state ID,
or access to internet.
7. Department of Motor Vehicles donor records are searchable within one week of
enrollment.
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APPENDIX D: CLINICAL CRITERIA FOR NEUROLOGIC DETERMINATION OF DEATH 
1. PREREQUISITES
• Presence of Central Nervous System (CNS) catastrophe that is compatible with brain death.
• Absence of complications that may confound assessment of brain death including hypotension and
metabolic derangements.
• Absence of drug intoxication or poisoning, absence of sedation and neuromuscular blockage.
• Core temperature > 32oC (90oF).
2. CARDINAL SIGNS OF BRAIN DEATH
• Coma:  Coma is defined as having no cerebrally mediated motor response to noxious stimuli. A
patient in coma will show no response to nail-bed pressure in any extremity, or to supraorbital or
temporomandibular joint pressure.
• Absence of brainstem reflexes
o Pupils: Both pupils show no response to bright light. Size of the pupils may vary from 4
mm to 9 mm. They may be round, oval or irregular. Preexisting pupillary abnormalities
must be ruled out.
o Ocular Movement: Occulocephalic reflex is absent giving the impression of doll’s eyes28
. Occulovestibular reflex is also absent29.
• Facial sensation and facial motor response
o No corneal reflex to touch with a cotton swab or gauze.
28 Must assure that the spinal cord is intact prior to performing this examination. 
29 Occulovestibular reflex is the deviation of the eyes to irrigation in each ear with 30-50 ml of ice water. 
Observe for 1 minute after irrigation and wait at least 5 minutes before testing on the opposite side 
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• Pharyngeal and tracheal reflexes
o No response to stimulation of posterior pharynx with tongue blade
o No cough response to bronchial suctioning
• Apnea
o Apnea is defined as the absence of respiratory movement and exchange of gases.
o Following conditions must be met prior to performing the apnea test.
 Core temperature ≥ 36.5°C or 97.7°F
 Arterial PCO2 ≥ 40 mm Hg
 Arterial PO2 ≥ 100 mm Hg
o Testing procedure: PO2 and PCO2 are measured before the test to ensure that requirements
have been met. The patient is pre-oxygenated for 10 minutes with 100 percent oxygen via
the ventilator. Apnea testing is done with pre-oxygenation 30  to eliminate respiratory
nitrogen stores, accelerate oxygen transportation, and decreases the risk of hypoxic
complications during apnea testing. The ventilator is removed and the patient receives 100
percent oxygen passively. The patient is monitored for any signs of chest movement.
Arterial blood gases are measured every two minutes until one of the following occurs: 1)
PCO2 is greater than or equal to 60 mm of Hg; 2) PCO2 is 20 mm Hg greater than pre-test
level; or 3) patient becomes unstable. At the end of the apnea testing the patient is placed
back on the ventilator at the previous settings.
30 Department of Surgical Education, Orlando Regional Medical Center.
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3. CONFIRMATORY TESTING
Sometimes the patient is unstable before apnea testing or may become unstable during the test 
compelling the physician-on-call to abort the test. In such cases, alternative tests may be performed to 
determine brain death although some hospitals may require both apnea testing and confirmatory testing 
before pronouncing a patient dead by neurological criteria. Tests that may be used for alternative testing 
include Cerebral Flow Scan, Transcranial Doppler Ultrasonography, Electroencephalography, and Cerebral 
Scintigraphy [193]. Electroencephalography was once the gold standard for determining brain death. 
However, EEG frequently gives false positive results and is therefore less accurate. The general trend across 
the country today is to use the cerebral flow scan.   
Cerebral Flow Scan:  This test provides unequivocal evidence of brain death. The test involves 
intravenous injection of radioactive isotope and taking static images at several time intervals including 
immediately after isotope injection, and between 30 and 60 minutes. To confirm that the isotope was 
injected into the blood stream, additional liver images may be taken to demonstrate uptake. If the images 
do not reveal blood perfusion in the brain, the patient is brain dead. Many hospitals however do not perform 
cerebral flow scans. A limitation of this test is that it may be false positive for patients who have undergone 
craniotomy or in children as they have a well perfused scalp. 
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APPENDIX E: DONOR MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL USED IN CORE’S DSA. 
The critical care endpoints that CORE strives to achieve through the donor management order set 
include: 
• Mean arterial pressure between 60 and 100 mm Hg
• Central venous pressure between 4 and 10 mm Hg
• Ejection fraction greater than 50%
• Arterial blood gas pH between 7.3 and 7.45
• PAO2:FIO2 >300 on PEEP = 5 cm H20
• Serum Sodium level between 135 and 160 mEq/L
• Blood glucose level less than 150 mg/dL
• Hemoglobin level greater than 10mg/dL
• Urine output between 1 and 3mL/kg/hr. for preceding 4 hrs.
In CORE’s designated service area, a potential organ donor is managed by the recovery team using 
the following protocol. 
Blood Pressure 
To maintain adequate organ perfusion and minimize ischemic injury to organs, systolic blood 
pressure is maintained above 100 mm of Hg. Alternatively, mean arterial pressure is maintained between 
60 and 65 mm of Hg. Fluids including crystalloids, colloids and blood products are infused to maintain 
adequate blood volume. Pressor drugs including Dopamine, Neosynephrine (Phenylephrine), Levophed 
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(Norepinephrine), Epinephrine, Dobutamine and Vasopressin are administered to induce vasoconstriction 
and maintain blood pressure.  
Hormone Replacement Therapy 
The brain dead organ donor undergoes a number of metabolic changes. Triiodothyronine (T3) & 
Thyroxine (T4) is limited resulting in decreased glucose metabolism. Anaerobic metabolism occurs leading 
to metabolic acidosis, decreased muscle contractility, and decreased cardiac output. This is also responsible 
for myocardial irritability, and responsiveness to inotropic drugs, leading to further vasodilation, and 
variations in heart rate and rhythm.  Administration of T3 and T4 (converted to T3) reverses this process 
[194, 195]. Aerobic metabolism is once again established. T3 also replenishes myocardial energy stores, 
decreases serum lactate, and reduces inotropic support. This improves and stabilizes myocardial function. 
After 30 - 90 minutes, the donor will mostly likely become tachycardic, temperature and blood pressure 
will rise. Titration of other pressors can then begin. CORE has developed its own hormone replacement 
regime for donor management in its designated service area.  
Fluid & Electrolyte Balance 
All electrolytes (Na, K, Ca, Mg, PO4) are maintained at optimal level. Maintenance fluids are 
adjusted to balance for excess or depleted sodium and potassium. Central Venous Pressure is maintained 
between 6 to 8 mm of Hg. Urine output is maintained above 100 ml/hr. 
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Diabetes Insipidus 
Diabetes Insipidus occurs because Antidiuretic Hormone (vasopressin) is no longer being produces 
and secreted into the circulation. As a result, kidneys excrete excessive amount of urine. and is characterized 
by urine output that is greater than 7 ml/kg/hr or 300 ml/hr with specific gravity of urine less than 1.005 
and rising sodium levels. Diabetes Insipidus can be managed by Desmopressin infusion and replacing all 
urine in excess of 250 ml/hr with 0.2 NaCl. 
Oxygenation 
CORE uses following guidelines to ensure that the donor is adequately oxygenated: 
• Pa(O2)31 > 100 mm Hg
• Aspiration Precautions:  over-inflate cuff, kerlex
• Titrate Fi(O2)32 to maintain Sa(O2)33 > 98%
• Tidal Volume between 10 to 12 ml/kg
• Maintain PEEP34 at 5-8 cm H2O
• Rate adjusted to maintain normal pH (7.35-7.45)
• Suction airway as indicated.
If the patient meets the criteria for lung donation, these additional requirements are followed: 
• Recruit lungs to maximize functionality
• Ventilator settings: Tidal Volume 12ml/kg ideal body wt, rate 10, PEEP at 5 cm H2O, Fi(O2)
1.0 (02 Challenge) 
31 Partial pressure of oxygen in arterial blood. 
32 Fraction of inspired oxygen maintained in a mechanically ventilated patient. 
33 Arterial oxygen saturation as measured by pulse oxymetry. Measures tissue perfusion of oxygen. 
34 Positive End Expiratory Pressure. Positive pressure ventilation keeps the alveoli patent. 
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• Mucomyst & Albuterol q3 hrs
• Solumedrol 15 mg/kg IV
• Chest physiotherapy
• P(O2) > 300 & PAP < 30 = Donor
• P(O2) < 300 & PAP > 30 = further evaluation with bronch
Temperature Regulation 
Warming and cooling blankets are used to maintain body temperature above 32oC. 
Insulin and Hyperglycemia 
In a brain dead donor, the body is no longer able to control insulin regulation. Blood sugar is closely 
monitored (every 2 hrs. or every hour if necessary). Insulin drip may be used after consulting with the OPC. 
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APPENDIX F: JUSTIFICATION FOR EXCLUDING NON-STANDARD CRITERIA DONORS. 
To be reimbursed through the Medicare and Medicaid programs, organ procurement organizations 
must meet the requirements established in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
Conditions for Coverage for OPOs (42 CFR §486.318). One of the Conditions for Coverage is that OPOs 
must have a donation rate that is not significantly lower than the national average for all OPOs.  The 
donation rate, also called the conversion rate, is defined as the fraction of eligible deaths that become organ 
donors. CMS defines an eligible death as a patient 70 years old or younger, who is legally declared brain 
dead, and who does not exhibit any of the exclusionary conditions listed in CMS Conditions for Coverage 
for OPOs (42 CFR §486.302). Donation rate allows CMS to assess how well an OPO has performed when 
compared to other OPOs. An organ donor who meets the eligible death criteria is called a standard criteria 
donor (42 CFR §486). The way eligible death and standard criteria donor (SCD) are defined under 42 CMS 
§486, eligible deaths can only result in standard criteria donors and standard criteria donors are always a
subset of eligible deaths. 
Individuals who do not die an eligible death can also become organ donors. These donors are 
classified as either donors after cardiac death or expanded criteria donors. Donors after cardiac death are 
declared dead using the circulatory determination of death criteria set forth in the Uniform Determination 
of Death Act. Expanded criteria donors are brain dead donors that do not fit the standard criteria donor 
profile. The Venn diagram in Figure 13 represents the relationship between all decedents, brain-dead 
decedents, eligible decedents, and the three types of donors. Relative sizes of the different pools are 
correctly depicted but are not to scale. 
CMS does not define eligible deaths for donors after cardiac death and expanded criteria donors. 
For the lack of an objective definition, these eligible deaths are neither observed in the real world nor in 
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our data. Eligible deaths observed in our data can only result in standard criteria donors. As a result, donors 
after cardiac death and expanded criteria donors lack a superset of eligible deaths. Since only standard 
criteria donors have an eligible death superset, we will restrict our analysis to estimating the effect of 
process breakdowns on the availability of organs from standard criteria donors. Including donors after 
cardiac death and expanded criteria donors in the regression model will produce biased estimates of the 
effect.  
Figure 10: Donors as a subset of eligible deaths and all decedents 
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APPENDIX G: CORE’S COMMUNITY OUTREACH BUDGET 
2012 – Budget 
• Salaries
Budget - $326,753 Actual - $326,753 
• Professional Education Expenses – this is for my staff to take seminars that would improve job
performance
Budget - $8,000  Actual - $7,504
• Parking Expenses – parking while traveling to events and presentations
Budget - $825   Actual - $901
• Printing Expenses – brochures, annual report, flyers, etc.
Budget - $30,530  Actual - $2,943
• Dues and subscriptions – local chambers of commerce and national organizations
Budget - $5,850  Actual - $530
• Registration fees/Meeting Expense – Conferences and meetings relevant to community outreach
Budget - $8,000  Actual – $3,160
• Travel expenses –  This includes tolls, mileage, hotel and meals for travel related to community
outreach
Budget - $101,480  Actual - $87,613
• Outside Consulting Expense – This is for any consulting we may need related to community
outreach
Budget - $3,600  Actual - $520
• Telephone Expense – This is for a partial cell phone reimbursement for calls relating to CORE
Budget - $1,800  Actual - $270
• Volunteer Expenses – This includes the annual volunteer dinner and gifts for volunteers
Budget - $39,800  Actual - $28,315
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• Advertising Expense – Media to promote donation including print, TV, radio, billboards
Budget - $1,000,000  Actual - $860,000
• Public Education Expense – This includes activities for multicultural and faith based outreach,
DMV events and materials, high school and college events
Budget - $131,090  Actual - $54,083
• Promotional Expense – This is for all of the promotional materials purchased like bracelets, pins,
mugs, etc.
Budget - $53,510  Actual - $23,795
• Public Relations Expenses – This would include our newsletter, chamber of commerce fees, and
partnership programs
Budget - $53,500 Actual - $1,907 
Totals    Budget - $1,764,738 Actual - $1,398,294 
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APPENDIX H: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES 
Figure 11: Predicted probability distribution of age of registrants from in-person outreach. 
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Figure 12: Predicted probability distribution of age of registrants from media campaign. 
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Figure 13: Predicted probability distribution of eligible death by decedent’s age. 
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APPENDIX I: POPULATION COMPARISON OF WV AND PA. 
Figure 14: Comparison of age distribution of WV and PA populations. 
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Source: United States Census Bureau [155]
APPENDIX J: REGISTRATIONS IN CORE’S DSA. 
Table 18: Registrants in Pennsylvania Counties (CORE’s DSA) 
COUNTY Year 2009 Year 2012 
ALLEGHENY 422,757 451,732 
ARMSTRONG 24,047 24,386 
BEAVER 56,275 59,307 
BEDFORD 15,544 16,328 
BLAIR 46,221 47,498 
BRADFORD 23,618 24,288 
BUTLER 71,248 74,917 
CAMBRIA 49,335 49,839 
CAMERON 2,034 2,116 
CLARION 11,596 11,767 
CLEARFIELD 28,103 28,809 
CRAWFORD 31,465 31,601 
ELK 12,804 12,984 
ERIE 103,602 105,763 
FAYETTE 39,053 40,943 
FOREST 2,026 2,020 
FRANKLIN 49,474 52,831 
FULTON 4,389 4,541 
GREENE 10,072 10,444 
HUNTINGDON 14,974 15,330 
INDIANA 25,635 26,177 
JEFFERSON 15,511 15,713 
LAWRENCE 30,470 31,411 
MCKEAN 15,935 15,949 
MERCER 37,337 38,868 
POTTER 6,073 6,111 
SOMERSET 25,888 26,303 
VENANGO 19,112 19,201 
WARREN 16,601 16,835 
WASHINGTON 70,305 74,473 
WESTMORELAND 120,330 125,247 
1,401,834 1,463,732 
Table 19: Increase in registrants with and without adjusting for increased drivers (PA) 
Year Registrants New Registrants 
2009 1,401,834 
2012 1,463,732 61,898 
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Table 20: Increase in registrants with and without adjusting for increased drivers (WV) 
Year Registrants New Registrants 
2010Q1 475806 
C
ou
nt
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ut
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de
 
C
O
R
E’
s D
SA
 Berkley -33732 
Cabell -27435 
Jefferson -19168 
Morgan -4825 
Wayne -5675 
Wood -26369 
CORE 2010Q1 358602 
Est. CORE 2009Q4* 354910 
2010Q4 491298 
C
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s D
SA
 Berkley -35157 
Cabell -28453 
Jefferson -19947 
Morgan -4942 
Wayne -5747 
Wood -27262 
CORE 2010 369790 
2012Q4 513088 
C
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C
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E’
s D
SA
 Berkley -37996 
Cabell -30002 
Jefferson -20988 
Morgan -5253 
Wayne -5782 
Wood -28350 
CORE 2012 384717 9111 
* We estimated 2009Q4 using data from 2010Q1. First, we calculated the
number of new drivers added in the three quarters between 2010Q1 and 
2010Q4. Then we up-adjusted the number of new drivers by 33% to account 
for drivers that would have been added in the one missing quarter. We 
subtracted this adjusted number from 2010Q4 to obtain the estimate of 
drivers in 2009Q4. This was repeated for the number of registrants.  
Table 21: New registrants in all of CORE’s DSA 
New Registrants 
Pennsylvania 61,898 
West Virginia 29,807 
CORE’s DSA 91,705 
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APPENDIX K: QALYS GENERATED FROM A DONOR IN CORE’S DSA 
Number of quality-adjusted life years generated by transplanting organs from a donor in CORE’s 
DSA is a function of the average QALYs benefit from transplanting each kidney, liver, heart and lung and 
the average yield of these organs from one donor. To compute the QALYs benefit from transplanting each 
type of organ, we rely almost entirely on published estimates of QALYs, and where applicable, make 
necessary adjustments to reflect the net health benefits that would be generated by transplanting organs 
recovered from CORE’s donors.  
Kidney, Heart and Liver Transplants 
For kidney, heart and liver we rely on the estimates provided by Mendeloff et al. [141]. These 
authors have used data from multiple sources to estimate the quality-adjusted life years generated from 
transplanting kidney, heart and liver. For survival rates after kidney transplants, they relied on the work of 
Wolf et al. [196] who have calculated the average survival of 20 years for cadaveric kidney recipients. For 
heart and liver, survival rate up to 10 years was obtained from SRTR Annual Report, 2002 [87]. From years 
11 through 18, the survival rate was based on Hertz et al. [197] for heart transplants and Jain et al. [198] 
for liver transplants. Beyond 18 years, they made two assumptions: 1) the survival rate continues to fall at 
an absolute rate of 3.5%; and 2) the survival rate falls by 15% every year.  
Life expectancy of those waiting for a transplant were obtained from Wolfe et al. [196] for kidney, 
from 2002 SRTR Annual Report [87] for heart, and from the Institute of Medicine study for liver [199]. 
For kidney transplant, health-related utility values were obtained from Russell et al. [200] and Hornberger 
et al. [201]. For heart and liver transplants, health-related utility states were obtained from Pinson et al. 
[202]. Mendeloff et al.’s central estimates of quality-adjusted life years gained are 4.40 from renal 
transplants, 5.62 from heart transplants and 5.71 from liver transplants.  
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Lung Transplants 
Groen et al. have estimated the quality-adjusted life years gained from lung transplantation in 
relation to the end-stage pulmonary disease [203]. They conclude that there is a small difference in the 
utility gains from lung transplantation depending on the type of end-stage pulmonary disease. We adjusted 
Goren et al.’s estimates for the mix of different end-stage pulmonary diseases in recipients of lungs from 
CORE’s deceased donors. A simplifying assumption we make is that all lungs that are recovered from 
CORE’s deceased donors are transplanted within its service area. Our analysis suggests that a lung recipient 
gains 2.32 QALYs if the lung comes from CORE’s donor. These computations are presented in Table 22. 
Table 22: QALY estimates adjusted for the case-mix of ESPD in CORE’s DSA 
Lung recipients by type of ESPD 
(2010-2012)* N = 175 
QALYs by 
type of ESPD 
[203] 
(2) 
QALYs 
generated (2010-
2012) 
(3) = (1)*(2) 
Proportion #   (1) 
Pulmonary Hypertension 0.06 10 2.53 26.17 
Cystic Fibrosis 0.13 23 2.31 53.91 
COPD 0.34 60 2.56 153.41 
Pulmonary Fibrosis 0.43 75 2.04 152.66 
Other 0.04 7 2.99 19.61 
All causes 175 405.76 
 Net QALYs gained per lung transplant from CORE’s donor = 405.76 / 175 = 2.32 
* ESPD is end-stage pulmonary disease.
* The proportion of lung recipients by type of ESPD (2010 – 2012) was obtained from OPO-Specific Reports on
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients [204-206]. The actual number of transplant recipients by ESPD was 
calculated by multiplying the proportions by total number of livers transplanted from CORE’s donors. For example to 
calculate the number of lung recipients 
After estimating QALYs from each type of organ transplant, we weighted these estimates by the 
yield of the respective organ from CORE’s donor to estimate the value of CORE’s donor in quality-adjusted 
life years. These are presented in Table 23.  
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OrgQALY OrgTxDon Wt.OrgQALY 
Kidney 4.40 1.14 5.016 
Liver 5.71 0.70 3.997 
Heart 5.62 0.23 1.2926 
Lung 2.19 0.28 0.6496 
Using the weighted quality-adjusted life years from each organ transplant and the cost of securing 
one additional donor, the cost of securing one additional quality-adjusted life year can be calculated using 
the following mathematical formula:  
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄$ = 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵$
� 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶. 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄
𝑘𝑘
𝑑𝑑
𝑘𝑘=𝑎𝑎
Substituting values from Table 23 in Equation 4, the value of one quality-adjusted life year (using 
central estimates of quality-adjusted life years) is: 
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄$ = $726,0005.02 + 4.0 + 1.29 + 0.61 = $66,491 
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Table 23: Weighting QALYs by the organ-specific yield in CORE’s DSA
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